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Rethinking Alimony: Marital Decisions and
Moral Discourse
Carl E. Schneider*
I.

INTRODUCTION

The riddle of alimony is why one former spouse should have
to support the other when no-fault divorce seems to establish
the principle that marriage need not be for life and when governmental regulation of intimate relationships is conventionally
condemned. Perhaps the most intelligent and probing recent attempt to solve that riddle is Ira Ellman's The Theory of Alimony.1 In this article, I have two purposes. The first is to ask
some questions about Professor Ellman's admirable inquiry into
this intricate and intractable problem. These questions are not
intended to disprove "the theory." 2 Professor Ellman has, at the
least, identified a number of ideas which should influence our
thinking about alimony, and he has shown why a number of
others probably should not. As he notes, in trying to solve the
alimony riddle he has taken on a large project, a project which
The Theory of Alimony only begins. I would like to contribute
to that project by showing where the theory's rationale for alimony falters and by proposing profitable directions for the inquiry Professor Ellman has so incisively begun. More generally, I
* Professor of Law, University of Michigan.
For the reasons given in Richard A. Posner, Goodbye to the Bluebook, 53 U. Chicago
L. Rev. 1343 (1986), I use the University of Chicago Manual of Legal Citation, id. at
1353. As a great man once said, "Faites simple." I am enthusiastically grateful to the
editors of the B.Y.U. Law Review for the uncommonly generous way in which they have
accommodated my wish to strike a blow for freedom from the inanities and insanities of
the Bluebook.
This paper was originally presented at a Brigham Young University Symposium on
Family Law. I wish to thank the participants in that symposium for their helpful comments. I owe a particular debt of gratitude to Edward H. Cooper, Joan W. Schneider,
Kent D. Syverud, Carol Weisbrod, and.Barbara B. Woodhouse for their careful reading
of an earlier draft of this article.
1. Ira Mark Ellman, The Theory of Alimony, 77 Calif. L. Rev. 1 (1989).
2. In order to avoid ceaseless incantations of Professor Ellman's name, I will henceforth frequently refer simply to "The Theory" or "the theory."
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hope my investigation will identify some of the core difficulties
any theory of alimony must confront. 3
My second purpose in writing this article arises from the
fact that perhaps solipsistically, I interpret Professor Ellman's
project in light of an observation of my own. A few years ago, I
argued that American family law has experienced "a diminution
of the law's discourse in moral terms about the relations between family members, and the transfer of many moral decisions
from the law to the people the law once regulated." 4 Professor
Ellman's enterprise speaks to this hypothesis in two ways. First,
it centrally considers how far courts must undertake moral discourse in order to apply the currently popular approaches to alimony. Second, it attempts to develop a theory of alimony which
is justifiable in other than moral terms and which tries to relieve
courts of the burden of moral discourse in deciding whether to
award alimony. 5 In my earlier article, I reached no conclusion
about the ultimate practicality, much less the ultimate desirability, of the trend away from moral discourse. While I cannot fully
answer those two questions here, Professor Ellman's inquiry is
an intriguing test case. The second half of this article thus explores in some detail the role of moral thinking in the law of
alimony. During that exploration, I will express doubts about
the success of any attempt to base a theory of alimony on morally "neutral" terms and of any attempt to bar courts from considering the moral relations of the parties in awarding alimony.

II.

PROFESSOR ELLMAN'S THEORY OF ALIMO~Y

Professor Ellman begins by arguing that alimony has lost its
rationale. The idea that divorced wives were entitled to alimony
was sustained for generations by the belief that marriage committed a man to supporting his wife for the rest of her life. He
3. I am delighted that Professor Ellman has agreed to respond in this symposium to
this article. To avoid giving him a constantly moving target, and because I hope my
comments will stand on their own, I have generally not tried to answer the points he
makes in his response. I thus refer to his remarks only to help make my reasoning
clearer.
4. Carl E. Schneider, Moral Discourse and the Transformation of American Family
Law, 83 Mich. L. Rev. 1803, 1807-08 (1985).
5. I am not suggesting that Professor Ellman approves of the trend; I don't know if
he does. I am only saying that he seems to accept it for the purposes of trying to develop
a theory of alimony which fits American family law as it now is. It seems to me that
Professor Ellman has left himself entirely free to argue that the trend is incomplete and
still leaves room for some kinds of moral discourse or even that the trend is undesirable.

197]

RETHINKING ALIMONY

199

could not escape that commitment by divorcing his wife, unless
she seriously breached her marital responsibilities to him. However, as our ideas about what spouses promise each other and
about gender roles have changed and as no-fault divorce has
proliferated, the traditional rationale for alimony has crumbled.
Today, "no one can explain convincingly who should be eligible
to receive alimony, even though it remains in almost every jurisdiction" (pp. 4-5}. 6
Professor Ellman of course knows that modern defenders of
alimony try to solve the riddle with either the law of contract or
partnership. But he rejects both solutions. Contract law fails for
several reasons. First, few couples actually enter express marital
contracts, and even those couples that wish to do so often find
that the law constrains them. Second, implied contracts are usually too partial and vague to be enforceable. And Professor Ellman sees a further drawback of looking to implied contracts. Because it is hard to imply a contract in the complex and fluid
circumstances of a marriage, and because there are no generally
accepted social standards which could be used in filling out the
contract's terms, a court would be hard pressed to identify those
terms without consulting its own views of marriage. Third, most
implied contracts speak to the couple's relations during their
marriage, not to their life afterwards. Thus those contracts can
tell a court little about whether to award alimony. And, given
the ambiguity of most such contracts, a court could not define
"breach" without an inquiry which essentially resembled the inquest into marital fault which no-fault divorce rejects. Fourth,
contract's measure of damages-expectation-produces awards
which exceed all ordinary understandings of reasonable alimony.
Fifth and finally, the semi-contractual analogy of restitution
fails because it requires courts to inquire into highly ambiguous
facts and to decide when a defendant's retention of the benefit
the plaintiff conferred is unjust, which once again compels
courts to inquire into "fault."
Professor Ellman also rejects partnership law as an analogic
basis for alimony. First, partnership law is designed only for
businesses, that is, profit-seeking enterprises. But marriage is
not in any ordinary sense such an enterprise, and it is generally
organized on importantly different principles. Second, partner6. All references to page numbers are, of course, to The Theory of Alimony (cited in
note 1).
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ship law does not provide for anything like alimony. Third,
while partnership law provides remedies for wrongful dissolution, for breaching the duty to serve the partnership, and for
failing to compensate a partner who has provided the partnership extraordinary services, each of these remedies requires the
court to consult some normative standard of behavior which is
available for partnerships (because they are businesses undertaken for profit) but which are not available for marriages (as to
which there are no universally accepted normative standards).
· Having dispatched all the standard rationales for alimony,
Professor Ellman turns to constructing his own. He begins by
"looking at the commercial use of contract" in order to "identify
the issues that commercial actors use contract to resolve-issues
that in marriage are left to alimony" (p. 40). He suggests that
when a supplier would have to make special capital expenditures
in order to sell parts to IBM, the supplier will insist on a longterm contract in order to protect those expenditures. He argues
that a wife7 may find herself in the same situation as the supplier, but may not be able to take advantage of the protections
commercial law offers the supplier. That is, a wife may make
investments which benefit the couple while they are together,
but which deprive her of earning power after they divorce. Examples of such investments include abandoning a career in order
to keep house or to bring up children or giving up some of her
career opportunities so that her husband may take fuller advantage of his. During the marriage these choices will often be economically rational, since they may increase the couple's joint income more than any alternative allocation of their efforts. But
after divorce, they may leave the wife with diminished, and the
husband with increased, earning capacity. In analogous circumstances, the parts supplier would protect its investment contractually. But the "indefinite nature of the parties' marital obligations" (p. 44) prevents the wife from devising a contract which
would similarly protect her investment.
The wife's inability to protect herself through such a contract is the problem alimony solves: the "loss that alimony is
7. Professor Ellman writes, "Recognizing this reality [that "alimony claims are in
fact overwhelmingly brought by women against men"], and to avoid tedious language, I
often use the term 'wife' and its referent pronoun 'her' as a shorthand for the spouse
with an alimony claim" (p. 4, n.2). For Professor Ellman's reasons, and for the sake of
clarity and consistency, I will follow his practice.
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intended to compensate for . . . is the 'residual' loss8 in earning
capacity that arises from . . . economically rational marital
sharing behavior" (p. 49). By assuring the wife that her economically rational investments will be protected, alimony protects
her from a loss of earning power arising out of such investments
in the marriage. Alimony thus prevents "distorting incentives"
(p. 50) from skewing marital decisions and "maximizes the parties' freedom to shape their marriage in accordance with their
nonfinancial preferences" (p. 51). That is, "[a] system of alimony that compensates the wife who has disproportionate postmarriage losses arising from her marital investment protects
marital decisionmaking from the potentially destructive pressures of a market that does not value marital investment as
much as it values career enhancement" (p. 51). Under this theory, alimony is "an entitlement earned through marital investment, and . . . a tool to eliminate distorting financial incentives,
. . . not a way of relieving need" (p. 52).
Professor Ellman proffers several rules for implementing his
theory. First, alimony is to be awarded only where the wife suffered. a loss in her post-marriage earning capacity because of an
investment in the marriage. Second, "only financially rational
sharing behavior can qualify as such marital investment," (p. 58)
and the wife may obtain alimony only where the investment was
successful. Third, the wife may recover half her lost earning capacity even though her investment was not financially rational
where the investment included primary responsibility for bringing up the couple's children, since "[p]arental care is ... not
merely a life-style preference but a traditional ideal" (p. 72) and
since "society relies for its continued existence on couples who
make just this financially irrational choice" (p. 71).

III.

ExAMINING THE THEORY

The Theory of Alimony is rich in virtues, and it contributes
abundantly to our understanding of alimony. First, it argues
forcefully what is painfully true-that we need a theory of alimony before we can devise sensible rules for it9 and that we
quite lack one. Second, Professor Ellman convincingly demon8. "This is a residual loss in the sense that it survives the marriage" (p. 49).
9. For a general argument in favor of just such theory-building, see Carl E. Schneider, The Next Step: Definition, Generalization, and Theory in American Family Law, 18
U. Mich. J. L. Reform 1039 (1985).
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strates some of the drawbacks of both contract and partnership
law as a basis for such a theory. He accurately points out many
of the weaknesses of the ideas about implied contract which undergird much current thinking about alimony (and about Marvin remedies); 10 he neatly shows that partnership law's repertoire is too small and too closely tailored to profit-making to
solve the alimony riddle. 11 Third, The Theory identifies a kind
of marital investment which seems a genuinely attractive candidate for alimonial protection: major changes of economic position which after divorce benefit one spouse and disadvantage the
other. Fourth, Professor l~llman's attitude is entirely attractive:
he seems refreshingly interested in following his ideas wherever
they may lead him; he does not merely try to justify conclusions
he has already reached on unrevealed grounds. Consequently,
his arguments are carefullly stated and honestly explored.
However, it would be startling indeed if anyone could solve
so challenging a riddle in one attempt. I will now explore some
of the problems I see witlh Professor Ellman's theory. My exploration will be in two stages. In the first stage (Part III of the
article), I will analyze the theory on its own terms. That is, I will
ask how well the theory serves its purpose of creating incentives
that correctly influence marital decisions and of removing incentives that "distort" them. I will find reason to fear that the theory's incentives will in fact not affect marital behavior at all. I
will argue that the structure and functioning of the theory's incentives are flawed because the theory isolates one transaction
from the whole range of marital decisions, and I will question
whether courts could satisfactorily make the calculations the
theory calls for. Behind these specific arguments lie two general
ones. First, Professor Ellman's solution is problematic because it
relies so heavily on economic reasoning, while people do not view
marriage entirely in terms of economic advantage, and we do not
want them to. Second, Professor Ellman's solution to the riddle
of alimony is problematic even as an economic theory because
his effort to create a manageable justification for alimony forces
10. Marvin v. Marvin, 557 P.2d 106 (Calif. 1976). Marvin held that unmarried
couples could contractually decide how their property was to be allocated and what support obligations might exist after their relationship had ended (at least to the extent that
the contract was not explicitly based on meretricious services). It also held that courts
might make such decisions for the couple where equitable grounds existed for doing so.
11. While I find much to agree with in Professor Ellman's criticisms of contract as a
sole and complete rationale for our present alimony regime, I would not reject the possibility that contract might be a bru:.is for a reformed law of alimony and marital property.
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him to ignore too many concerns that are as much economic as
those the theory relies on.
However, I will postpone until the second stage (Part IV of
the article) my comments on the theory's desirability. And even
there I will not try to propose my own global theory of alimony.
Rather, I will contend that Professor Ellman's theory seems to
award alimony in one important category of cases where alimony
should be awarded, but that it fails to award alimony in anumber of cases that seem just as meritorious and that it could
award alimony in some cases that seem unmeritorious. And I
will argue that, in order to succeed either in creating the right
incentive structure for marital decisions or in settling alimony
disputes fairly, a theory of alimony must take into account the
moral relations of the parties.
In Part IV, I will also use the theory as a vehicle for evaluating the trend toward a diminution in moral discourse in family
law. I will argue first that it is not possible to justify a theory of
alimony in morally neutral terms. And, I will argue, courts
resolving disputes over alimony need to be able to take the
moral relations of the parties into account, since those relations
will often be central to understanding the parties' behavior and
to doing justice in resolving their dispute. As I will say later,
"[T]he people the law seeks to affect think in moral terms. A
law which tries to eliminate those terms from its language will
both misunderstand the people it is regulating and be misunderstood by them." I will acknowledge that there are reasons we
might want to restrict judicial inquiries into the parties' moral
relations, but I will suggest that these reasons are not
dispositive.
A.

Alimony and the Hortatory Function: Or, Who Listens to
the Law?

Some years ago, Professor P. S. Atiyah said that the judicial
process serves
two main functions. In the first place it provides a means of
settling disputes by fair and peaceful procedures, a function
which may be variously termed that of conflict-adjustment or
dispute-settlement. In the second place the judicial process is
part of a complex set of arrangements designed to provide incentives and disincentives for various types of behaviour . . . .
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There is no simple or agreed term for this aspect of the judicial
function which I propose to call the hortatory function. 12

Alimony has ordinarily been considered part of the dispute-settlement function of law. Divorcing spouses disagree about who
owes what to whom, and a court resolves the dispute by ordering
or not ordering alimony. The court seeks to do justice between
the parties by examining their present situation and their relationship during the marriage. The court has commonly not been
expected to calculate how its decision might affect the behavior
of married couples generally. 13
Although Professor Ellman does not quite say so, perhaps
The Theory of Alimony's most original contribution is to propose that alimony should instead be seen primarily in terms of
the hortatory function. At the theory's core is the principle that
the "function of alimony . . . is to reallocate the post-divorce
financial consequences of marriage in order to prevent distorting
incentives" (p. 50). While The Theory argues that its system is
"consistent with equitable notions," it rests principally not on
those notions, but rather on the "proposition that marital investment decisions should be free from potentially distorting
penalties and incentives" (p. 51). The Theory emphasizes this
point by insisting that its system "is fundamentally different
from contract analysis," since contract analysis looks backward
to fashion a remedy for violated promises, while the theory
"looks forward; it generates alimony rules that encourage the
kind of marital behavior we want" (pp. 51-52).
If the theory of alimony is essentially hortatory, if it seeks
primarily to alter the incentives which affect marital decisions
rather than to arrange the affairs of a divorced couple as equitably as possible (or to carry out the couple's contractual agreements), then we need first to ask whether the theory can effectively serve the hortatory function. Will the theory's incentives
12. P.S. Atiyah, From Principles to Pragmatism: Changes in the Function of the
Judicial Process and the Law, 65 Iowa L. Rev. 1249, 1249 (1980). In my own work, I have
called this function of law the "channelling" function. The Jaw performs the channelling
function by creating or (more often) supporting social institutions and practice>:; which
are thought to promote desirable ends and then by channelling people into using those
institutions or practices. See Carl E. Schneider, Family Law (forthcoming).
13. Because this is an article about the principles that ought to govern alimony, I
have been talking in terms of what courts do. In fact, however, it is conventionally believed that the large majority of divorce disputes (perhaps as many as 90 percent) are
not litigated. Rather, they are thought to be negotiated by the parties and rubberstamped by courts that are too busy to examine divorce settlements closely.
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have the intended effect on the spouses' behavior? Will they
have any effect on it?
In gauging the hortatory effect of a system of alh:nony, I
think we must begin with a skepticism born of our accumulating
knowledge about how well people know the civil law and how far
they consider it in making decisions. There is a growing body of
evidence that people live in (to a lawyer) dismaying ignorance of
and indifference to the incentives and penalties legal rules strive
to create. Even businessmen, who would seem to have the sophistication and incentives to learn and use the law's tools, apparently ignore them startlingly often. Indeed, people often
seem actively and deliberately to resist the law's norms, particularly when, as regularly happens, those norms conflict with other
social norms. 14
Not only should we generally question legal reforms that assume that people shape their behavior in response to legal incentives, but we should be particularly skeptical of reforms that
seek to affect marital decisions of the kind The Theory treats.
There are several reasons such marital decisions may be particularly impervious to the law's incentives. One reason is that
couples don't know what the law's incentives are. Direct evidence of this comes from an empirical study of knowledge about
the law of alimony, marital property, and child support which
finds
the ordinary person to have scant knowledge of the terms of
the marriage contract as defined by the statutory laws regulating divorce. Even individuals with substantial rational incentives to know those laws well, in fact know little. Thus, marriage appears to be a contract whose statutory terms are
typically "discovered" by the parties (if at all) only when
things begin to go wrong, and whose full import is revealed
only after a judge has spoken at divorce or the parties have
settled in the light of their guess about how a judge would decide contested issues. 111
14. The locus classicus of this view is Stewart Macaulay, Non-contractual Relations
in Business: A Preliminary Study, 28 Am. Soc. Rev. 55 (1963). Another fine statement of
it is Robert C. Ellickson, Of Coase and Cattle: Dispute Resolution Among Neighbors in
Shasta County, 38 Stan. L. Rev. 623 (1986). See generally, Carl E. Schneider, Social
Structure and Social Control: On The Moral Order of a Suburb, 24 Law & Society Rev.
875 (1990).
15. Lynn A. Baker & Robert Emery, When Homo Economicus Marries: An Empirical Study 7 (unpublished manuscript).
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And even couples who know what the law of divorce is often will
ignore it because they believe that they will never get divorced
and thus will never be subject to it. 16 As Professor Ellman points
out, "[p]eople generally enter and conduct marriages on the assumption that they will endure ..."(p. 15).17
Nor are couples who ignore the law regulating the economics of divorce necessarily foolish. For one thing, even on the
bleakest view of divorce statistics, half the couples who believe
they will never be divorced are right. For another thing, it is far
from safe for couples to rely on the law of divorce. Where one or
both of the spouses moves out of the state in which the relevant
decision was made, the couple may find themselves subject to a
new (and possibly quite different) divorce law. Even if the
spouses never move, their own state legislature or courts may
alter-radically-that state's law of divorce. 18 Even if the law remains stable, the couple's situation at that point in the indefinite future when the law would be applied to them is likely to be
so unpredictable that they could not adequately anticipate how
the law would affect them. 19 In addition, couples may rationally
conclude that, given the plenitude of factors that will affect decisions about their economic affairs, the information costs of getting reliable (and regularly updated) advice about what their
state's law might be at an uncertain time in the future would be
unjustifiably high.
There is yet a further reason why couples might not want to
consider the law of alimony in making marital decisions and
even why the law might not want to encourage them to do so.
16. Professors Baker and Emery write,
By systematically viewing themselves as unrepresentative of the population at
large, that is, by ignoring base rates, young adults preserve a romantic view of
marriage that makes knowledge of the law personally irrelevant. Perhaps because individuals believe that they have found "true love" or are confident that
they will "work harder" at their marriage, divorce does not matter and the
statutory terms of the marriage contract can be ignored.
ld. at 90.
17. This is why, Professor Ellman suggests, couples have not widely taken advantage
of the expanded scope of marital contracting.
18. This is a lesson which any couple watching the no-fault revolution and its accompanying changes in the law of alimony, marital property, child custody, and child
support should have learned well. Indeed, as Carol Weisbrod observed to me, the central
(and popularly recognized) lesson of no-fault divorce is probably that the rules of divorce
can change drastically at any moment.
19. The Theory itself makes something like this point when it argues that a wife
cannot protect her investment "because of the indefinite nature of the parties' marital
obligations" (p. 44).
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Couples might well feel that getting advice about how each
would fare individually in a divorce would represent a kind of
betrayal of their commitment to their marriage. Getting such
advice might seem to say that they did not regard their marriage
as genuinely permanent and did not trust each other to reach a
just settlement of their financial affairs if it ever ended. Getting
such advice might seem to imply that they were thinking of
themselves as separate individuals, even as self-interested bargainers, rather than as a marital entity. One spouse's suggestion
that such information be acquired might thus dismay the other
spouse and even disconcert the spouse who made the suggestion.
For all these reasons, then, spouses might rationally prefer simply not to inquire into the law of alimony.
Even if spouses know the law of alimony, it is unlikely to
govern their behavior, since it is apt to be swamped by so many
other things. When husbands and wives make decisions, they are
surely affected by their personal long- and short-term economic
interests. But they are also influenced, and usually more importantly influenced, by their family's economic interests, by the economic interests of each other and their children (as many
purchases of life insurance attest). They think about things besides money: How will our decision affect our careers, our plans
to have children, our chances to spend time with our children,
our children's education, our love for each other, our ability to
go back to school, our choice of where to live, our religious obligations, our social status, our relations with our friends, our duties to our aging parents, our promises to each other in the past,
our hopes for each other in the future? Husbands and wives
brood about the exigencies of the quotidian: How will a decision
affect getting to work in the morning, picking up the children at
daycare in the evening, or playing softball with the team at
night? They are influenced by things unseen: Le coeur a ses
raisons que la raison ne connaU point. Thus spouses are swayed
by their shifting moods, by their emotional natures, by their
pulling and tugging for power, by their yearning to avoid decisions, by the habits, traditions, sympathies, spites, irritations,
understandings, accommodations, and affections of a life long
lived together. All these and much else besides influence a family's decisions. It is a bold thing to suppose that the law of alimony will figure largely among them. 20
20. As I argue in Part IV, we might want to provide alimonial relief for marital
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In short, our first problem with The Theory is that its primary purpose is to create incentives, yet its incentives seem
likely to go unnoticed or unheeded by the people they are intended to influence. Let us for the moment assume, however,
that the theory will have some effect on incentives. Will it have
the intended effects? To have the intended effects, the theory
must be fully and accurately communicated to spouses. Further,
if they are to act in reliance on the theory, spouses must be confident that courts will apply it correctly. But the theory on its
face is not simple, and as I will argue later, it would be hard to
apply. These facts would impair both communication of the theory and confidence in its application. Particularly since most
people learn about the law of divorce from colorful but misleading reports in the press and from equally unreliable war stories
from friends, couples would easily be led to misunderstand or
mistrust the theory. For example, one might readily imagine a
wife making a sacrifice she otherwise would not have made because she thought she would be reimbursed when in fact she
would not be because the sacrifice was not economically rational.
One might equally well imagine a wife refusing to make a sacrifice that would benefit her and her family because she lacked
confidence that a court would recognize her sacrifice as an "investment" and would accurately calculate the value of her lost
earning capacity. Similarly, a husband might refuse to accept his
wife's sacrifice, on the (in principle erroneous) view that the
family's extra income would not be justified by the risk he perceived he was running of high life-long personalliability. 21
In sum, then, there is a vital difficulty with a law of alimony
whose purpose is hortatory: The law cannot affect behavior unless it can make itself heard and understood and can offer incentives or disincentives strong enough to compete with the other
incentives people face. My first doubt about Professor Ellman's
theory is whether it meets this test. This is not to suggest that
the law of alimony can never affect marital behavior, though I
suspect it will always have difficulty in doing so. It is to say that
investments even if people make those investments without incentives because fairness
between the parties requires it. But The Theory is not based (at least primarily) on such
an argument. Rather, it rests on the arguments about incentives which we are
investigating.
21. Some of these results might be socially desirable, but they are not desirable
under the theory.
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this particular theory is so narrow in its effects and so complex
in its workings that I doubt it will change the·way couples act. 22

B. The Supplier and the Wife
1. Is the analogy accurate?
Even if The Theory's incentives would be detected, heeded,
understood, and believed, we still need to ask whether they are
necessary. The theory rests on the need to eliminate "distortions" in particular marital decisions. But to the extent those
distortions are not presently occurring, the theory's new incentives are presumably less necessary. Are marital decisions in fact
being distorted by the present law of alimony in the way The
Theory assumes? This is, of course, a question that cannot be
answered without empirical evidence which we lack. However,
the anecdotal evidence of the cases and, I suspect, the experience of most of the people reading this article suggest that husbands and wives already do invest greatly in their marriages
without the theory's incentives. 23 Indeed, I would suppose that
one spur to alimony reform might be the sense that wives particularly have too often invested in that way and then been left
impoverished after divorce.
The possibility that couples may be making the investments
which The Theory seeks to encourage even without the benefit
of the theory's incentives invites us to look more closely at the
22. I have been expressing doubts that the theory's law of alimony would greatly
affect the behavior of most spouses. I have not, of course, been arguing that the law can
never have any effect on human behavior. Surely it can and does. Professor Ellman's
article in this symposium notes that David Chambers has shown that the law can enhance the willingness of fathers to pay child support. Making Fathers Pay: The Enforcement of Child Support (1979). But that example seems to me to confirm the law's weakness rather than to demonstrate its strength: Litigants and courts trying to collect child
support are working under relatively favorable circumstances. They are trying to make
specific, identifiable individuals do a specific, concrete thing in the immediate present.
They are able to use the law's strongest sanctions-issuing orders diverting income from
employee-obligors and sending them to jail. Yet even with these powerful advantages,
the law fails to obtain its money in a troubling proportion of cases. And for the reasons I
have just canvassed, the law is trying to do something exceedingly more difficult in using
alimony hortatorily.
23. Of course, there is no way of knowing how many more spouses would invest in
their marriages given the theory's incentives. And, of course, it is possible to argue that
such investments should be recompensed even though they were made without any expectation of compensation. But, again, this is an argument about fairness in dispute settlement, not an argument about the hortatory function of alimony on which the theory
rests.
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incentive structure The Theory sees in the present law of alimony and the ones it seeks to establish. The key to understanding those incentives lies in The Theory's central example of the
company that supplies specialized parts to IBM and that cannot
supply those parts without making capital investments that will
be lost if IBM stops buying the parts too soon. Professor Ellman
compares the supplier's situation with that of a wife who wishes
to invest in her marriage by sacrificing her own earning power in
ways that increase the couple's total income while they are married but that will leave the wife with only her reduced earning
power after a divorce. The Theory argues that both the wife and
the parts supplier are making "investments a self-interested bargainer would make only in return for'a long-term commitment"
(p. 42). However, while the parts supplier can protect itself
through a long-term contract, the wife cannot do so because the
"indefinite nature of the parties' marital obligations . . . defeats
ex post judicial efforts to reconstruct implied contracts" and
"prevents most spouses from working out express agreements ex
ante" (p. 44). 24
How compelling is the analogy of the parts supplier? It
seems to me to present two problems. First, The Theory may
not accurately describe the situation of the parts supplier. Second, the wife's situation may not be wholly similar to the parts
supplier's.
As to the first point, The Theory assumes that the supplier
would not invest the capital necessary to provide parts to IBM
without a long-term contract which would ensure it of recouping
its investment. However, the supplier might be willing to invest
the capital without such a contract if the return on its investment were high enough to justify the extra risk. That return
might be of two kinds. First, it could be the high price per unit
which IBM might pay in order to avoid a long-term commitment
and to do business with a particularly attractive supplier. Second, it might be the supplier's chance (even if not the guarantee) of developing a good relationship with a new customer. That
is, the supplier's risk would buy it a chance it might otherwise
not have to develop a highly (perhaps uniquely) desirable customer which was tied to the supplier by an established track rec24. Professor Ellman notes that "[s]imilar difficulties explain why the law abandoned rather than refined fault-based adjudications" (p. 45).
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ord and by the mutual reliance, understanding, and comfort
which can grow between a customer and a supplier over time.
The wife might well calculate that she could get returns on
her investment that would be analogous to the two kinds of returns to the supplier I just described. First, her sacrifice of earning power might so much increase her husband's income that
she might conclude that the economic benefits to her during the
marriage outweighed her possible loss in the event of divorce.
She might also calculate that the economic benefits of the sacrifice would result in an accumulation of marital pr~perty great
enough that her share on divorce would recompense her for her
investment. And she might feel that the immediate non-financial
rewards of the marriage were great enough to recompense her
for the risk of reduced earning power should the marriage end.
Second, the wife might feel that the risks of her investment were
justified by the possibility that it would help build a marriage
with a particularly desirable partner which would ultimately be
lasting and rewarding.
My first point about the analogy to the supplier .has been
that the supplier might not need to protect itself in the way The
Theory supposes. My second point about it is that the wife may
be differently situated from the supplier. For instance, the supplier in The Theory must make all its investment up front; the
entire investment immediately becomes a sunk cost. This is not
true of most of the investments The Theory contemplates the
wife making. Those investments are typically decisions not to
pursue a career or not to pursue it ambitiously. The less time
that expires between the sacrifice and the divorce, the easier it
will presumably be for the wife to resume her career without
major loss. The wife will often not make a single, fixed-cost investment. Rather she will gradually decide not to start law
school this year, but to put it off until next year, or perhaps the
year after, or maybe the year after that. One might conclude
from this that, if the divorce occurs soon after the sacrifice, the
wife will usually have lost little; if it happens long after the sacrifice, she will have had the advantage of the increased familial
earnings during the marriage. Neither of these situations may
provide the wife a fully satisfactory remedy, but both differ from
the bleaker picture drawn in the contrast between the wife and
the supplier, and both call into question the need to avoid the
"distorting" incentives which the theory hypothesizes.
There may be other important differences between the wife
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and the supplier. For instance, while the supplier is, as Professor
Ellman says, a "self-interested bargainer" (p. 42), the wife may
not be. Indeed, perhaps she ought not be. She will be interested
in the welfare of her husband for his own sake, because she loves
him, and for the sake of her children, because she loves them.
She may therefore want to make a sacrifice for her husband or
her children that is in the nature of a gift. She might even say
that, for the law to hold her harmless for that gift changes the
nature of the gift in a way that makes it less meaningful both to
her that gives and them that take. Or the point can be put differently. One might say that her utility is immediately increased
by giving her husband or children a gift, so that the wife is getting an immediate return on her investment in the form of the
gratification that comes from giving the gift.
Even if the wife is a "self-interested bargainer," she differs
from the supplier in another important way. The Theory assumes that the supplier is interested solely in economic profit.
Even if this is true of the supplier (and there is reason to think
that business managers are motivated by many things besides
economic profit, like the size and prestige of their firms), it is
unlikely to be true of the wife. All the wife's choices about working and its alternatives will have important non-economic aspects. This creates a number of difficulties for the theory. For
example, The Theory generally assumes that working at a job is
something that people want to do (since it produces income),
and that they would give up well-paying jobs only for some
other way of earning income (as by increasing a spouse's earning
power so that the family's wealth is maximized). But for many
people the assumption is, for a variety of reasons, false. Many
people dislike many kinds of work. They may be glad not to
work, particularly if they have alternatives they regard as more
gratifying, even if not more lucrative.
Consider a couple who both feel this way about employment. Suppose that the wife does not enjoy her job, that she
finds rewards in being a housewife, and that she enjoys the cultural activities that she can pursue when she is not employed
outside the house. Suppose that the husband does enjoy his job
as a law professor and that he is offered a position in a New
York law firm which win immeasurably increase his income but
which will also require him to do disagreeable work, to work
harder and longer, to be away from home a good deal more, to
move to a city he detests, and to run the risk that he may be
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unable to return to teaching after too many years away from it.
Suppose further that the wife is intensely anxious to move to
New York, her childhood home and the city of her dreams. Suppose finally that it would be economically rational for her to give
up her job to stay home and take care of the house so that her
husband could take the job in New York. The wife's agreement
to do so stops looking like a sacrifice by the wife that benefits
the husband and might even begin to look like a sacrifice by the
husband that benefits the wife. 25
Professor Ellman, of course, knows that "some spouses who
leave the marketplace to become full-time homemakers will be
doing exactly what they want" (p. 52, n. 146). But he argues that
the wife's reason for leaving the marketplace has "no bearing on
the question of whether the adjustment should be considered
marital investment ... " (p. 52, n. 146). This argument seems to
fit awkwardly with Professor Ellman's justification for his theory. There are two reasons for this.
First, the theory's rationale for alimony rests on the analogy
to the situation of the supplier. And in the hypothetical I have
just posed, that analogy looks weak. The supplier's immediate
motive for !!laking its special capital investment is to increase its
earnings by selling parts to IBM. In my hypothetical, the wife's
motive may be partly to increase the family income, but it seems
awkward to say that she "has sacrificed some career prospects to
invest instead in her marriage" (p. 47). Rather, she is getting
something she immediately wants-to be able to leave the job
market and spend time in cultural pursuits. She may be gambling that the benefit of not having to work and of being able to
spend her time in other ways will not have been bought at the
cost of later wanting but lacking enhanced earning ability. Further, it seems awkward to think of the husband as being in the
position of IBM--of extracting something from the supplier that
it does not want to give (the capital investment necessary to
meet IBM's specifications) for IBM's own profit. He may rather
have been the person from whom something was extracted that
he did not want to give (moving to a job and city he disliked).
Second, the theory's rationale for alimony rests on the desire to eliminate "distorting" incentives and penalties. But to
25. Let me repeat that, as I said in note 6, I am for the sake of clarity and consistency following Professor Ellman's practice of referring to the claimant for alimony as
the wife.
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say that we have to create an incentive to marital sharing (in the
form of giving up working) to encourage people like the wife in
the hypothetical to feel safe in giving up a job seems unsatisfactory. Far from encouraging marital sharing, it seems to encourage its opposite. It allows the wife to follow her inclination
not to work while requiring the husband to insure that she not
be injured by her choice, even though the husband did not want
to take on the extra burdens needed to enhance his earning
power (and might even want to give up that enhanced power to
return to teaching if the couple divorced).
My criticisms of the analogy to the supplier are not intended to show that the theory which rests on that analogy is
wholly misconceived. But they suggest that the situations of
both the supplier and the wife are importantly more complicated than The Theory allows and that the analogy provides a
weaker base for alimony than The Theory supposes. More specifically, the supplier might be willing to enter into the relationship with IBM without the contract which The Theory assumes
would be necessary, and thus the wife might also rationally invest in her marriage without the incentive The Theory would
create. In addition, the wife is differently situated from the supplier in ways that may sometimes make it less necessary that she
be given an incentive for marital sharing through some substitute for a contract. In short, seen in terms of the law's hortatory
function, the theory seems to overstate the need for the kind of
alimony it would allow. 26

2. Is the measure of damages correct?
Despite what I have argued so far, let us assume arguendo
that couples will know and heed the law of alimony, that the
analogy to the supplier works, and that spouses need an
alimonial incentive to allow them to sacrifice their earning potential to maximize their family's income. What ought that incentive be? The Theory's answer, of course, is that spouses
should recoup their lost earning capacity. Is that the incentive
that best accords with the theory's logic?
To answer this question, we must return to The Theory's
26. In addition, seen in terms of the law's dispute·settlement function, the theory
leads to results whose fairness seems at least disputable, since the theory calls for com·
pensation where it is the husband rather than the wife who apparently made the
sacrifice.
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central analogy to the parts supplier. The Theory, as we have
seen, reasons that the supplier would protect itself with a longterm contract before making the capital investment necessary to
enable it to supply parts to IBM, but that a wife investing in her
husband's career cannot similarly protect herself. Alimony's purpose, then, is to imply by law a contract the wife cannot make
for herself. "[T]o protect her marital investment and thereby
encourage her to make it, we must provide the wife with an
equivalent noncontractual remedy" (p. 54). All this seems to
suggest that the wife's remedy should be the same as the supplier's-the traditional contract measure of damages, which is of
course expectation.
The Theory rejects that measure on the ground that "a contract claimant receives nothing without first establishing that
the other party breached; in alimony we will not ask why the
marriage ended or whether the claimant bears some fault for the
divorce" (p. 66). 27 Let us postpone until Part IV the conclusion
that we are barred from asking why the marriage ended. Given
the purpose of alimony-to prevent the distortion of decisions
about investments in marriages-is expectation the correct measure of damages? On one view, it seems to be. To see why, let us
look again at the case of the supplier. The supplier will not sell
parts to IBM unless it is assured an adequate return. How do we
know what that adequate return is? We could require courts to
decide that question for themselves case by case. But the difficulty and inefficiency of such a method have (in part) led to the
irrebuttable presumption that the adequate return is whatever
the parties bargained for. Hence expectation is the standard
measure of damages in contract law.
Similarly, The Theory assumes that the wife will not sacrifice her earning capacity for the sake of a larger family income
unless she is assured an adequate return. We have no way of
knowing what kind of return she would regard as minimally adequate. Thus, on the analogy to the supplier, we would ask what
her actions suggest she regarded as adequate, and look to what
she bargained for, i.e., her expectation.
It might seem that the wife ought to regard as yielding an
adequate return any investment that The Theory considers eco27. The Theory also argues that "to measure that claim by the spouse's lost expectation might induce one spouse to terminate the marriage since she would receive the
expected financial gain from her marital investment without remaining married" (p. 66).
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nomically rational, that is, any sacrifice of earning capacity that
yields her a dollar more than she could earn by refusing to sacrifice her earning capacity. This is because the wife is presumably
economically better off after any such investment. Since it ought
to take no more than such a gain to induce the wife to make the
sacrifice, one might conclude that she need be given no more
than an equivalent amount-a restoration of her lost earning capacity plus one dollar-in damages. But even if the wife were
thinking in purely economic terms, she might not regard the dollar as an adequate inducement to make the investment, if only
because she might regard the return as too small to justify the
risks associated with the investment. In addition, of course, the
wife will inevitably be influenced by a host of non-economic considerations (including, for example, her reluctance to sacrifice
the personal and social rewards she receives from her career),
many of which may induce her to require a large return on her
investment. Both the economic and the non-economic factors
may loom large in the wife's calculations. But they will do so in
complex ways that will differ from person to person. Thus, if our
goal is to make it as safe for the wife as the supplier to make a
long-term investment, it would seem we should offer both the
same return-what each expected. Because the theory would
only restore to the wife her lost earning capacity and would not
assure her the economic gains she expected from her investment,
the theory seems likely to undercompensate her in terms of its
own rationale.
On the other hand, The Theory's method of calculating
damages could also sometimes give the wife a greater return
than the theory calls for-i.e., a return great enough to induce
the wife to make the investment. To see why, let us return to
the analogy to the supplier. The wife's implied contract should
do no more than the supplier's contract would do-allow her to
recoup her investment and receive a reasonable return on it. In
what form would the supplier expect to recoup its investment?
In the form of regular payments for the parts supplied. And in
what form does the theory assume the wife expects to recoup her
investment? In the form of the extra income brought in from the
husband's increased earning power. If the increase in earning
power is great, the wife may fully recoup her investment and her
reasonable return on her investment even before the divorce.
She would then, on the analogy to the supplier or in terms of
what it would take to induce her to make the investment, not be
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entitled to or require the further compensation the theory contemplates. In the theory's terms, the wife's loss would no longer
be "a residual loss in the sense that it survives the marriage" (p.
49).

In short, The Theory's method of calculating alimony could
overcompensate a claimant because, by excluding benefits accruing to her from the sacrifice during marriage, it ignores a standard way she is compensated for that sacrifice. To put the point
in terms of the theory's central analogy, its method is akin to
allowing the supplier to sue IBM on their long-term contract but
barring IBM from introducing into evidence the payments it had
made on that contract.
The Theory's method of calculating damages may, certainly,
sometimes yield a rough measure of what it would take to make
the wife's investment safe. But I have argued that, considered in
terms of the law's hortatory function, the method seems susceptible to two kinds of errors-first, that it may in some cases offer
too little to create an incentive to marital sharing, second that it
may in some cases offer more than would be necessary to create
such an incentive.
Professor Ellman's theory of alimony rests primarily on the
need to create a system of incentives which would encourage a
certain kind of marital investment. Thus far, we have raised several questions about those incentives. We have suggested reasons to be concerned about whether the incentives would be recognized, whether they would be heeded, and whether they would
be correctly understood. We have found infirmities in the analogy on which the argument for the incentives rests. And we have
wondered whether the remedies the theory proposes accurately
serve alimony's hortatory function. We now need to ask whether
the theory's incentive structure is socially and normatively
desirable.

C. Evaluating the Theory's Incentive Structure
Most readers of The Theory of Alimony are likely to be immediately surprised at the narrow scope of alimony under its
rules. It singles out one of the many kinds of marital decisions
-a spouse's financially rational sacrifice of earning capacity-and provides that inefficiencies arising out of that particular decision and that decision only shall be repaired on divorce. 28 On
28. As I noted in summarizing the theory, it also awards alimony in one class of·
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further reflection, readers may also be struck by the way in
which that decision is abstracted from the context in which it is
made and treated in isolation from the entirety of the marriage.
In what follows, I will ask whether the theory's goal is appropriate, why the theory gives relief on divorce for only one kind of
investment, and whether that relief can be properly calculated
outside of the larger context of the marriage.
The Theory's purpose is to remove "distorting" incentives
and penalties from marital decisions. But what is being distorted? The answer seems to be decisions to maximize family
income where the wife has an economic incentive (the fear of
lost earning power after divorce) to refuse to make the "'rational' choice of maximizing the marital income" (p. 47) by sacrificing some of her career interests. 29 Thus when Professor Ellman speaks of "adopt[ing] suboptimal marital patterns" (p. 50),
he is speaking of failing to maximize the family's income. But
why is optimizing family income so crucial a goal that it ought to
be the only basis (along with recompensing some kinds of sacrifices by a parent caring for children) for alimony? As The Theory properly acknowledges in criticizing the analogy of alimony
law to partnership law, "[w]hile many marriages are 'profit-sharing' in the sense that the parties intend to share their economic
success, they are not 'profit-seeking' in the sense that financial
gain is the primary purpose of their joint endeavor" (p. 33).
Nor is it clear how The Theory's goal of optimizing family
income fits with its argument that social dissensus bars divorce
law from consulting any view about the goals of marriage. Perhaps The Theory assumes that optimizing family income is so
uncontroversial a goal that no one could object to it. In fact,
however, I think that many people would feel that thus singling
financially irrational sacrifices-those where the spouse assumes primary responsibility
for child care.
29. Professor Ellman also suggests that, in the absence of the kind of alimony he
proposes, husbands whose wives made the kind of sacrifices which the theory will recompense have an incentive to divorce, since the "party who has already received a benefit
has an incentive to terminate the relationship before the balance of payments shifts" (p.
43). Professor Ellman assumes that if the husband stays married, he must at least share
his added earning power with his wife, while if he divorces her he can keep it all for
himself. How true this is will vary from marriage to marriage and will depend, among
other things, on the rules governing the division of marital property and child support.
That the husband will often have an incentive to leave the marriage large and evident
enough actually to affect his behavior seems to me uncertain. It seems less uncertain that
a failure to reallocate the loss of the wife's earning power may give her an incentive to
stay in the marriage.
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out the optimization of family income sends an improper message about the purpose of marriage. Such people could reasonably argue that doing so is part of what they could regard as The
Theory's larger error of conceptualizing marriage so largely in
economic terms. But even if this goal were quite uncontroversial,
there would remain a further problem: It may be impossible to
create a system of incentives for optimizing family income that
does not simultaneously create collateral incentives whose effects are less clearly desirable. To see how this might be so, let
us examine two of The Theory's justifications for its incentive
structure.
First, The Theory suggests that its alimony regime "maximizes the parties' freedom to shape their marriage in accordance
with their nonfinancial preferences" (p. 51). In fact, however, the
theory has the (clearly unintended) effect of valuing marital investment at the expense of investments in careers and of putting
what would seem to be "distorting pressures" on career decisions. The theory's alimony regime would tend to induce the
wife to abandon her career, since it allows her to do so without
financial risk when she is confronted with the incentives of increasing family income or staying home to take care of the children and, possibly, accommodating her husband and pleasing
herself. The theory's system thus seems to steer a spouse, usually the spouse with the lower earning potential, away ,from a
"complete" career. This result is especially problematic since in
today's world that spouse is likely to be the woman. After all,
the great changes in women's participation in the job market of
the last two decades have been urged not just because they give
women more earning power, although that of course is important. They have also been urged on the grounds that a career
can be intellectually, socially, and emotionally rewarding, can
give women the sense and reality of autonomy, and can give
women greater social power. To put the point a little differently,
a theory of alimony that chose as its goal encouraging women to
pursue demanding careers would not be self-evidently less justifiable than one whose goal was maximizing family income.
The problem here, of course, is not that Professor Ellman
has wickedly preferred a bad goal to a good one. It is that he has
chosen a good goal, and that the necessary but unintended consequence of the means he has chosen for promoting it is to interfere with reaching another good goal. Yet there may well be no
good way of serving both good goals at once. There is an element
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of perversity in the result I am describing. While the theory
seems likely to have the effect of inducing women to abandon
careers, it would seem harsh to try to encourage women to pursue careers by denying wives compensation for the marital sacrifice of giving up careers. The difficulty here arises out of the
clumsiness of the law's hortatory function: It may always be difficult to structure the law so that its incentives have the intended effects; it may he impossible to do so in areas of life as
complex as marital decisions.
Professor Ellman not only justifies his theory in terms of its
liberating effect on spouses' decisions, he also justifies it in terms
of its promotion of marital sharing. He writes, "Unless society
wants to discourage sharing behavior in marriage, its law cannot
penalize the spouse who shares" (p. 51). But his system of alimony encourages only one kind of sharing-giving up a career in
order to maximize family income. And that kind of sharing is
problematic in two ways. First, calling such a decision "sharing
behavior" seems imprecise, since it can be thought of as selfserving: it seems designed to maximize the welfare of the sharer,
with possibly only the incidental effect of maximizing the welfare of the family. Second, this is only one, and perhaps not the
most desirable, kind of sharing. Another kind of sharing, for example, would be that of a wife who gave up her own career opportunities so that her husband co:uld promote his, even if that
meant some loss of family income. 30 Yet the theory conspicuously declines to promote such sharing on the grounds that it is
economically irrational.
This last point leads us to ask whether other kinds of transactions fit the rationale for alhnony just as well as the transaction the theory favors. As we have just seen, Professor Ellman
suggests, "Unless society wants to discourage sharing behavior in
marriage, its law cannot penalize the spouse who shares" (p. 51).
Ought we not then refrain from penalizing any spouse who
shares in any important way? Ought we not compensate spouses
who have made any kind of financial sacrifice for each other? In
particular, ought we not compensate spouses who have sacrificed
earning capacity in economically "non-rational" ways? And
ought we not compensate spouses who have made non-economic
30. Let me once again repeat that, as I said in note 6, I am for the sake of clarity
following Professor Ellman's practice of referring to the claimant for alimony as the wife.
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sacrifices, at least where those sacrifices can reasonably be put in
economic terms?
One form of marital sharing which the theory entirely excludes from consideration is the income which th~ wife receives
from the husband as a result of her investment. As I argued earlier, the wife might well receive from her husband a full return
on her investment during the marriage. But the theory "ignores
the exchange that takes place during the marriage" (p. 55). Professor Ellman writes that under modern divorce law, "[t]he remedy, if either spouse believes the current exchange is unfair, is to
end the, arrangement. [My] theory of alimony accepts that proposition, seeking only to make sure that on divorce neither
spouse is left with residual effects that would distort marital
decisionmaking" (p. 56). Divorce is surely one remedy for unfair
exchanges, but is it, should it be, the only one? It seems an unsatisfactory remedy here, because the spouses will not view the
exchange as unfair during the marriage. That is, the parties will
see the wife's sacrifice and the husband's contribution of income
to his wife as reciprocal sacrifices, and even if the wife receives
more than the husband, the husband is likely to believe that he,
like the wife, is making a good investment in the marriage. The
unfairness only arises when the marriage ends and the wife receives a second compensation in the form of alimony for her
investment.
Making divorce the only remedy for unfair marital exchanges seems additionally problematic in two ways. First, doing
so may create an incentive for divorce: If a spouse knows that
the law will if necessary provide some remedy for an unfair exchange during marriage, that spouse can afford to stay with the
marriage in the hope of improving the exchange and the marriage. If the spouse knows that the law will not provide such a
remedy, the spouse has an incentive to leave the marriage as
quickly as possible to escape the effects of the unfair exchange.
Second, spouses who are on the short end of an unfair exchange
during marriage may have excellent reasons for not abandoning
the marriage. They may, for example, be doing their best to
make the marriage work, or they may feel that staying in the
marriage is best for the children. Why should such spouses be
taken to have waived their only remedy for the unfair exchange?
More basically, why should not an unfair exchange be considered when settling the financial affairs of the parties? Why
should alimony be confined to "residual" losses? Why should a
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continuing economic sacrifice by one spouse for the other during
the marriage be less worthy of compensation than an economic
sacrifice whose effects are felt only after divorce? For that matter, how realistic is it to say that "lost earning capacity is the
only continuing financial loss" (p. 53). vVhile that may be true in
some senses, it seems false in others. Suppose that a wife contributes disproportionately to the family income and that the
husband consumes the family income disproportionately. The
wife might have emerged from the marriage with "more" if she
hadn't been involved in the unbalanced exchange during the
marriage; she might suffer the continuing economic loss of owning less of the things that made life more comfortable for her.
One might even say that, had the exchange been better balanced, she might have had more earning power, in the sense that
she might have had larger income-generating assets.
Of course, this kind of disproportion could be rectified (assuming that rectification is desirable) through that other remedy
the law provides for marital misallocations, namely, the law regulating the division of property on divorce. Reasonably enough,
Professor Ellman has not yet developed a theory to govern property division nor worked out how property division and alimony
interact. He is of course aware of the need for a theory of marital property and hints that one is in the works (p. 53, n.147). We
may hope that he will soon turn to creating one, if only because
property division and alimony cannot be adequately treated separately and perhaps should be analyzed under the same principles, since both answer a single question: how should the economic assets (broadly understood) of the spouses be allocated on
divorce?
Given the theory's imperative of encouraging "sharing behavior in marriage," it is also hard to see why alimony is not
available in a particularly common and consequential kind of
marital sharing-the kind where a "financially irrational" sacrifice was made. In this category fall cases in which one spouse
accommodates the other's "lifestyle preferences," as where a
wife, at her husband's behest, makes a financially irrational decision to be a housewife. Here we have a potentially severe loss of
earning capacity that will (as the theory insists a loss must in
order to be a basis for alimony) continue after divorce. But despite the size of the loss, under the theory, it is not compensable
because the sacrifice was not economically rational. (Indeed, the
worse the loss of earning capacity, the less compensable it is be-
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cause the less economically rational it is.) Professor Ellman explains that "when one spouse foregoes a market opportunity to
accommodate a lifestyle preference, both spouses know that
lower income will result. On divorce, the spouse who made the
financial sacrifice suffers no additional financial burden as a result, beyond that already incurred during the marriage" (p. 61).
But why should this make any difference? The housewife seems
to be in the same position as the IBM supplier and indeed as the
spouse who sacrificed her earning power in order to maximize
the family's income. All made a decision with lasting financial
consequences. All will suffer the consequences of that decision
alone if the relationship ends. All will more readily make the
decision if contractual protection is available. It is available for
the supplier; the theory would provide an alimonial substitute
for contractual protection for the spouse whose sacrifice increases family income. Why is the same substitute unavailable to
the spouse whose sacrifice does not increase family income?
Why is her decision not "marital sharing behavior" which we
want to protect on divorce? 31
A possible difference between the cases of the two sacrificing wives is that where the wife's sacrifice maximized family income, the husband's earning power will often have been increased by the sacrifice, while where the wife's sacrifice did not
maximize family income, the husband's earning power will often
not have been increased. Should this difference matter? On the
theory's principles, it is hard to see why. As I argued in the preceding paragraph, alimony seems necessary if the housewife who
makes the non-rational sacrifice is not to face a "distorting" incentive. Further, the husbands' situations in the two cases we
31. Is the answer that we only want to encourage marital sharing of a financial
kind? As I have been suggesting (and as The Theory itself seems to say), it is hard to see
why we should not want to encourage all kinds of marital sharing. But even if we want to
(or, as The Theory suggests, as a practical matter must) limit ourselves to encouraging
only financial sharing, isn't an "economically irrational" sacrifice financial sharing, since
it represents a gift of the wife to the husband of some of her earning power?
Professor Ellman suggests that "we have no basis at all for a social policy that encourages one spouse to agree to reduce marital income to accommodate the other's nonfinancial values" (p. 62). Professor Ellman helps justify encouraging financially rational
sacrifices on the theory that the market rewards socially desirable behavior, and it is true
that that policy cannot justify encouraging financially irrational sacrifices. But, first, that
policy seems to me particularly weak applied to marital decisions, since marriage is
surely one of the areas of life least well evaluated in market terms. And, second, why is
not the policy in favor of marital sharing itself an adequate basis for encouraging even
financially irrational sacrifices?
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have been discussing do not necessarily differ. The husband of
the wife who sacrificed to increase the family's income will not
always have gained an increase in earning power from her sacrifice. For example, if the wife left a poorly paying part-time job
in order to do housework which the couple would otherwise have
had to pay someone to do, the sacrifice may be financially rational without increasing the husband's income. And a financially irrational' sacrifice might increase the husband's income
(because, for instance, of the wife's help with his business entertaining) since the wife might be able to earn more working
outside their home than helping her husband in it.
Some insight into The Theory's refusal to recompense financially irrational sacrifices may be found in its explanation of
why the wife receives no alimony where the investment yields no
gain, The Theory reasons, "If she invests in herself and does
poorly, she has no one else to cover her loss. There is no reason
why someone else should cover it if she invests in her husband
instead and he does poorly" (p. 67). But this argument seems
dangerous to tP,e theory, since it suggests the question why
someone else should cover the wife's loss if she invests in her
marriage and it does poorly. Professor Ellman further explains,
"We certainly do not want the wife, or the husband, to have
their judgment influenced by an alimony system which makes an
investment in one's spouse riskless, but not an investment in
oneself'' (p. 67). However, isn't that close to being the practical
effect of the theory's rule? The only risk the sacrificing wife runs
is the risk that the investment in her husband won't pay off at
all. But as long as there is some gain f'rom the sacrifice, then the
wife is guaranteed the full value of her lost earning capacity. She
is thus relieved of the many risks that her investment in herself
might otherwise have run.
I have been finding problems in the fact that the theory
gives relief on divorce only for one kind of investment. I now
want to raise the question whether that relief can be properly
calculated outside of the larger context of the marriage. We have
already encountered one problem with calculating relief on the
narrow base the theory requires: I have argued that the wife will
sometimes be overcompensated because the theory does not take
into account the return she receives on her investment during
the marriage and that she will sometimes be under-compensated
because the theory does not give her expectation damages.
But the problem is larger than the failure to consider the
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wife's immediate return on her investment in calculating alimony. None of the husband's "marital sharing behavior" can be
taken into account to reduce what he owes his wife. Spouses engage in marital sharing partly because they expect and get reciprocal sharing. Sometimes this reciprocal sharing is given in direct response to the other spouse's sacrifice. But it does not
necessarily .obey the Aristotelian unities of action, time, and
place. There may not be an immediately evident logical connection between one transaction and another. The two transactions
may be widely separated in time. One transaction may be an economic one, while its reciprocal may be non-economic. Sometimes one transaction is expressly exacted as the price of the
other, sometimes not. But, in a good marriage and sometimes
even in a bad one, these transactions may roughly balance out.
By singling out one kind of transaction from this stream of
transactions, we may exaggerate the need for legally provided
incentives of the kind the theory contemplates. We may also
compel compensation where compensation has already been paid
in terms satisfactory to the spouses while they were married,
and that she will sometimes be undercompensated because the
theory does not give her expectation damages.
One of the theory's justifications for singling out a single
marital transaction among many seems to be that calculating the
net effects of all the possibly relevant transactions would be too
difficult: "Trying to assess all the nuances of the spouses' bargain to determine whether each has received full value during
the marriage is impossible" (p. 51). And later, "[T]he law cannot
evaluate every aspect of marital behavior in fixing the divorcing
parties' financial obligations. If we do not impose a limit, we
would have to consider every sacrifice one makes for one's mate,
and this would extend to nonfinancial losses as well" (p. 61).
Part of the argument here is that "[a]djudication of such claims
would require examining the reasons for the divorce-who is at
fault, who 'breached'" (p. 53), an examination the theory takes
to be essentially impossible and outside the law's purview in an
era of no-fault divorce.
The question of the law's purview I wish to postpone until
Part IV. The arguments about the difficulty of making the required calculations seem to me genuinely weighty. But they raise
two questions. First, the calculations the theory itself requires
are, as I am about to argue, themselves greatly complex, speculative, and inexact. It is not clear why the theory accept<> those
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drawbacks in one context but rejects them in others. Second,
while it may be impossible to reach a fair result when so many
complicated and obscure facts must be considered, is it not also
impossible to reach a fair result without considering them?
However difficult it is to weigh all the transactions between
spouses, isn't it equally difficult to single out one sacrifice from
all the rest when in the minds of the couple that sacrifice was
part of a larger context? Will it not at least sometimes be unfair
to do so?
In its discussion of marital contracting, The Theory recognizes the problem with singling out one kind of transaction from
all the rest. Professor Ellman writes, "In many marriage disputes it would surely distort the parties' real expectations, and
upset their reasonable reliance based upon those expectations, to
single out one discrete, specific agreement for enforcement without examining the larger relationship in which it arose" (pp. 3031). And he observes that "neither party is likely to consider
... more specific commitments as having a meaning independent of the more complete relationship contemplated by the
marriage" (p. 20, n.45). 32 This seems to me quite right. But when
Professor Ellman comes to his theory of alimony, he discounts
this kind of argument and says that his "theory assumes that we
can sensibly isolate decisions that a couple rationally expects
will enhance their aggregate income, and ensure that in making
such a decision neither takes a risk of disproportionate loss if
divorce then occurs" (p. 62). Yet it is not clear why the theory
makes that assumption or that it is correct. Nor is it clear that a
theory that rests on the need to· adjust the law to affect marital
decisions properly can safely ignore so much of the incentive
structure of marriage.
In this section, I have asked why the kind of marital sharing
the theory seeks to promote ought to be promoted at the expense of other marital goals. I have also asked why some kinds
of marital sharing are protected but other kinds are not. And I
have questioned whether one marital transaction can properly
be isolated from the rest. All these points present problems for
32. Indeed, at one point Professor Ellman recruits the "singling out" argument to
reject a criticism of his alimony theory which I advanced a version of above, namely, that
"the wealthy man's wife has already been compensated for her marital investment." Professor Ellman responds that this argument "assumes an unrealistically accurate measure
of the total give-and-take of marriage, of which the wife's investment is just one part" (p.
55). So it does. But Professor Ellman's theory seems just as open to this response.
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the theory as an exercise of the law's hortatory function, since
they raise questions about kinds of behavior the law can and
should properly encourage. These points also present problems
for the theory as an exercise of the law's dispute-settlement
function, since they raise questions about the theory's fairness.
Those questions I will postpone until Part IV, because first we
need to ask whether, even on the theory's own terms, alimony
can be calculated with enough precision to make the theory
workable.

D. Calculating Alimony Under the Theory
The Theory of Alimony is a long article on a hard topic.
Quite reasonably, therefore, it does not show with any specificity
how alimony would be calculated under its principles. Since
such a demonstration is a crucial next step, I will try to sketch
some of the problems it may encounter. Those problems seem to
me numerous and serious.
To receive alimony, the wife must show that her "sacrifice"
or "investment" was "financially rational." First, how is she to
show that there was a "sacrifice" or an "investment"? The Theory says that the couple need not have intended an investment
for the wife to receive alimony. This may create some uncertainties about whether there has been an "investment." Sometimes,
of course, the investment will be amply clear: the parties will
have made a deliberate decision in which both of them realized
that the wife was giving up a career opportunity so that her husband could increase his income. But what if no such decision
occurs? The Theory calls for alimony even when the "investment" is not a "sacrifice" (that is, when the wife wanted to give
up the career opportunity because of her own preferences about
spending her time and not in order to enhance marital income).
But what if the "investment" is not an investment at all? What
if it was not made with the intention of allowing or helping the
husband to increase his earning power? What if the husband can
show that he would have been able to increase his earning power
whether or not his wife had made the "investment"?
As these questions suggest, it will often be difficult to tell
whether a "compensable event" has occurred. Is it enough that
the wife gives up a career at the time the husband takes a higher
paying job? Does she also have to show that her decision was
necessary to make his possible? Suppose the two decisions are·
significantly separated in time? Suppose that rather than quit-
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ting a high paying job, the wife refused a promotion? Suppose
that she simply didn't seek a promotion? Suppose that she simply never sought a high paying job? That she never sought employment? That she never sought training for employment?
Suppose that the couple were married while the wife was still in
school and that the question of the wife's working simply never
arose?
In this last case, it would seem that the theory would not
call for alimony, since the couple never made a decision which
needed to be protected from distorting influences and since the
wife never changed her position. Yet upon divorce the wife in
that case might be economically and socially in exactly the same
position as a wife who had made a decision during her marriage
to abandon a career in order to maximize her family's income.
Why should the happenstance of the timing and explicitness of
her decision matter, and matter so dispositively?
The second question the requirements for alimony raise is
what "financially rational" means. If the husband is offered a
job that would immediately pay less but eventually pay more, is
it financially rational for him to take it? What if it would immediately pay more but would eventually pay less? What if he is
offered a job that offers the possibility of high gains but also the
substantial risk of high losses? What if he thinks the new job
will be financially more rewarding than his old job, but that conclusion is objectively incorrect?
In order to qualify for alimony, the wife must show not just
that her investment was :financially rational, but that it in fact
resulted in a "gain." How is that gain to be measured? The gain
is presumably the gain acquired by the wife's having sacrificed
her career to benefit her husband's. To discover whether that
sacrifice was economically worthwhile, one presumably has to
figure out how much each of them did in fact earn and compare
it with how much each of them would have earned had the wife
not made the sacrifice. Over what period are these earnings to be
calculated? Over the period foreseeable when the sacrifice was
made? Over the life of the marriage? What if the divorce takes
place fairly soon after the sacrifice and no gain has yet developed, but the sacrifice was a serious and permanent one? Can
the wife argue that a gain would have developed had the marriage lasted? And even if we are confident that there has been a
gain in family income, how are we to know whether that gain is
attributable to the wife's sacrifice?
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The wife's measure of damages is her "loss in earning capacity" (p. 73). This apparently means that the measure is the difference between her earning capacity as it actually is and her
earning capacity as it would have been had she not made the
sacrifice. But "is" and "would have been" at what point? Since
we are talking about a loss that survives the marriage, "is" presumably means for the rest of her working life, and "would have
been" presumably means for the rest of her working life had she
not made the sacrifice. How, then, are we to determine the wife's
earning capacity as it is and as it might have been over those
long reaches into the future? The easier inquiry is surely into
the wife's earning capacity as it is. But even this inquiry has its
perplexities. For example, is it enough to ask what the wife is
presently earning and to call that her earning capacity? Suppose
she could be making large sums practicing law but is in fact (for
reasons unconnected with an economically rational investment
in the marriage) making small sums teaching it? Or suppose that
the reason for the wife's sacrifice of earning capacity has passed
(or eventually will pass) and that she could work her way back
to the earning capacity she had sacrificed. If she failed to do so,
would she be treated as having that higher earning capacity?
The Theory seems to suggest that she should be, for, in discuss-·
ing the analogous claims to alimony of wives who cared for children, it says that "the woman who remains a homemaker even
after her children are grown ceases to benefit from Principle
Three. She can recover only half the earning capacity she would
have lost assuming she had gone ba~k to work when the children
were grown, whether or not she actually did" 33 (p. 73). This calculation may be relatively easy to make where the issue is taking
care of children, since there will be a particular children's age at
which we might reasonably ask whether the mother could go
back to work. In other cases, however, it will be harder to identify the time when she could, or should, have returned to a
higher-paying job.
These difficulties, however, are as nothing compared with
the difficulties of calculating what her earning capacity would
have been but for the sacrifice. Suppose, for instance, that the
wife sacrificed one career and took a less lucrative one that al33. Principle Three states that "The Homemaker Spouse May Claim Half the Value
of Her Lost Earning Capacity, Even Though It Exceeds the Market Value of Her Domestic Services, When These Services Included Primary Responsibility for the Care of
Children" (p. 71).

230

BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[1991

lowed her to keep house and to help her husband with his career. In calculating alimony, do we have to ask whether she actually had the ability to achieve the higher earning power that
might have come from the sacrificed career? Whether she would
have been willing to pursue the better-paying career as it became more onerous? Suppose that the sacrificed career had
many branches, some more lucrative than others. Are we to assume that she would have taken the most lucrative route? If she
gave up a career as a teacher, would we have to gauge the possibility that she would have gone into administration and thus
earned more? 34
How well could we even determine what career she gave up?
If a wife sacrificed going to college to support her husband
through college and medical school, should we simply compensate her for her forsaken college degree? Or should we speculate
about whether she would herself have gone to medical school after college? And done post-graduate work in microbiology? And
gone to work for Warner-Lambert? And become a senior research scientist? And won a Nobel Prize?
One might try to answer such questions by looking at the
sacrificing spouse's ambitions and abilities. However, that
method seems likely to founder on the unrealiability of people's
ambitions as predictors of their actual behavior and of estimates
of people's abilities as predictors of their worldly success. Further, using ambition in this way might systematically advantage
men over women in calculating alimony. At present, at least,
men more than women are socialized to have large ambitions for
their careers. If ambition is used in calculating alimony awards,
sacrificing husbands will on average be better compensated than
sacrificing wives.
All this raises an important question about the social function of alimony. Alimony has long worked to help protect women
from some of the economic (and social) consequences of their
weak position in the marketplace. While Professor Ellman's theory of alimony protects women who have a career to sacrifice
from the consequences of one kind of sacrifice, it does nothing to
protect women in other circumstances. Perhaps alimony ought
not do so. As Professor Leyy observes, there is an argument to
34. This is Professor Ellman'~. own example. The Theory acknowledges the general
difficulty of calculating alimony under the theory and provides some instances of that
difficulty (p. 78). But the acknowledgment seems to me too sanguine and the examples
seem to me too few to convey fully the scope of the difficulty.
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be made that individual divorced men should not bear the burden of ameliorating a problem that is more properly society's. 35
But I do not think this function of alimony should be jettisoned
without a more prolonged and considered inquiry.
In calculating the wife's hypothetical earning capacity, we
will not only need to look at the wife's career. We will also need
to look at the social circumstances that would have affected her
career. For instance, we might want to ask whether there would
have come a time when it would have been economically irrational for her to further pursue the forsaken career, given a conflict with her husband's career. Should we have to ask whether
she would have abandoned the career at that point? Ought we
say, for purposes of calculating alimony, that she should have
abandoned it at that point even if we don't think she would
have?
Do we need to ask not just what career the wife would have
pursued had she not made the sacrifice, but also what it would
have cost her to do so? Should the saved expenses of starting
and maintaining a career be subtracted from the earning capacity she would have had but for the sacrifice? If she gave up college in order to support her husband through his medical school,
do we subtract from the differences in earning capacity the expenses of college? Some of these expenses will of course be financial. But do we also subtract the value of the labor which a
wife would have had to expend in a sacrificed career but which
was not expended given the sacrifice? If the wife gave up a career in a law firm in favor of keeping house, and if she would
have had to work harder as a lawyer than she did keeping house,
do we subtract the value of the work she did not do from the
amount of her recovery, since some of the difference in earning
power is attributable to the extra work she would have done, not
to the sacrifice? 36
It is worth noting that, when courts began to decide
whether professional degrees are "property" divisible on divorce,
they realized that valuing that kind of property would require
courts to ask questions very much like the ones I have been asking. The impossibility of answering such questions with confi35. Robert J. Levy, Reminiscence About the Uniform Marriage and Divorce
Act-and Some Reflections Abouts Its Critics and Its Policies, 1991 B.Y.U. L. Rev. 43.
36. There may also be an argument for subtracting from the award of alimony any
expenses to which the husband was put in pursuing the more lucrative career made possible by his wife's sacrifice.
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dence helped deter courts from treating degrees as property (although courts have sought other means of compensating people
who supported spouses through professional school).
The Theory's way out of many of these quandaries is to
"combine statistical data suggesting average outcomes in like
cases with evidence particular to the claimant" (p. 79). But this
solution seems partial and problematic. Many of these questions
cannot be solved simply by looking to average outcomes for
cases, because those cases have not yet occurred. We are, after
all, projecting the wife's hypothetical "non-sacrifice" earning
power into the future, possibly for as long as thirty or forty
years or even more. And as we saw, it will sometimes be hard
even to know what career she would have been pursuing. Thus
there will often be quite baffling questions about what a "like
case" would be. And there will often be no adequate evidence
about any truly "like" case, as The Theory acknowledges (p. 79,
n.187).
Not only does using statistical data seem technically problematic, but there will also be major questions of fairness in relying on averages. In roughly ha:lf the cases the wife will get too
much, in roughly half too little. Even though she presumably
gets something close to the correct amount in the middle range
of cases, the scope for error seems great. Professor Ellman
rightly says that "rules of law often call for speculative measurements ..." (p. 78). But, as he acknowledges, "they may also
reject them when they are too 'speculative" (p .. 78). It is hard to
think of many rules of law that call for as many measurements
that are as brutally speculative as those the theory calls for. And
it is hard to justify expanding that unattractive category. 37
In sum, there is a danger that the wife will be recompensed
in a large amount (where the sacrifice ·was dramatic and where
the difference in earning power matters for a prolonged period)
even though she has already drawn more than the benefit of the
sacrifice during the marriage (where she worked relatively little
during the marriage but drew on the extra income her husband
made because of her sacrifice) and even though she might not in
fact have come close to earning the amount her "earning power"
would theoretically have entitled her to, all on a calculation
37. As my colleague Kent Syverud commented to me, wrongful death cases involving minors can call for remarkably problematic calculations of lost earnings. But as he
also noted, "it is distasteful speculation there as well."
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based on highly uncertain suppositions about what might have
happened and on far from certain calculations about what did
happen. There is also a danger that the wife will not be recompensed at all despite a great disparity in her earning power and
her husband's, despite her great need, and despite her great sacrifice, because she cannot demonstrate that she would have succeeded in the career she sacrificed or because the sacrifice was
not economically rational.
One way of summing up the points I have made in Part III
is to say that the theory seems problematic even when it is considered just as an economic model. The model's shortcomings
are suggested by the fact that it must be narrowed in so many
ways. First, all transactions except financial transactions are excluded from the model. Second, all financial transactions except
those between one or both of the spouses on one hand and outsiders on the other are excluded. Even financial transactions
with outsiders seem to be limited to wage-earning and entrepreneurial activities. Within this small world, the theory applies a test of maximizing joint financial wealth. Yet economists
regularly deal, for example, with trade-offs between wealth and
leisure, with psychic income in numerous forms, and so on.
Even narrowed as it is, the model is probably unmanageable
in practice. As I have tried to show, it seems unlikely that the
theory would be noticed and heeded widely and accurately
enough to serve the hortatory function which is its justification.
And it seems likely that the theory would involve courts (and
divorcing spouses and their lawyers) in impossibly speculative
calculations.
·

IV.

THE THEORY AND MoRAL DiscouRsE

A. Stating the Issues
I am interested in The Theory of Alimony not just for its
answers to the riddle of alimony, but also because of what it
reveals about the diminution in moral discourse that I believe
has recently characterized family law. By a diminution in moral
discourse, I mean that courts and other lawmakers are less likely
to discus~ legal problems in moral language (and are more likely
to try to transfer moral decisions to the parties the law is regulating). This does not, of course, mean that lawmakers' decisions
are necessarily less moral, that family law is necessarily deprived
of a moral basis, or that lawmakers may not have moral reasons
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for avoiding moral discourse. It simply means that the terms
lawmakers use in explaining (and presumably in thinking about)
their work are decreasingly drawn from the vocabulary of morals
and are increasingly drawn from the discourse of economics,
psychology, public policy studies, medicine, or from those aspects of legal doctrine which speak in other _than moral terms. 38
In my earlier article, I· tried only to describe, and not to
evaluate, the trend toward diminished moral discourse. An article on alimony is hardly the place for a full-dress evaluation of
the language of family law, but The Theory provides a useful
test case of the trend. And I hope that in the course of evaluating the trend, we can also deepen our understanding of the theory of alimony, for I will conclude that many of the theory's
drawbacks arise from its attempt to justify alimony in morally
neutral terms and to keep courts from asking what the moral
relations of the spouses are.
As should by now be clear, questions about the moral justification for alimony and the need for and worth of inquiries into
the moral relations of the divorcing spouses are central to The
Theory of Alimony. Professor Ellman's starting point in devising
a theory is the belief that the triumph of no-fault divorce stands
for the principle that courts ought not investigate the moral relations between the spouses when making any of the decisions
associated with divorce. Professor Ellman also reasons that the
disintegration of a social "consensus" about the normative content of marriage confirms the need for that principle. He rejects
analogies to contract and partnership as bases for alimony in
large part because both would require courts to undertake just
such investigations. As he reasonably argues, both contract and
partnership law smuggle fault (broadly understood)3 9 back into
divorce law by requiring courts to ask what the initial agreement
between the parties was and what constitutes a breach of it. In
sum, the law of alimony which Professor Ellman describes is a
38. I describe the trend at length in Carl E. Schneider, Moral Discourse and the
Transformation of American Family Law, 83 Mich. L. Rev. 1803 (1985). There I say, "A
decision made on moral grounds turns on whether particular conduct is 'right' or 'wrong,'
whether it accords with the oblig&~ions owed other people or oneself." Id. at 1827.
39. Technically, marital fault refers only to behavior which constitutes grounds for
divorce in a fault-based system. But Professor Ellman uses the term more broadly, to
refer to any kind of misbehavior which might be taken into account in making decisions
about awarding alimony and dividing marital property. For the sake of convenience, I
will follow his practice.
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law in which moral discourse has become increasingly
inappropriate.
Professor Ellman's own theory of alimony, while "consistent
with equitable notions," is not principally based on equitable
ideas, but rather rests "on the proposition that marital investment decisions should be free from potentially distorting penalties and incentives" (p. 51). Whether or not Professor Ellman set
out to do so, he has developed a theory one of whose attractions
will be that it may be essentially justified in other than moral
terms. It is a theory which, in other words, basically takes a normally functioning market as its guide and asks how such a market can be achieved within marriages so that husbands and
wives can make decisions free of "distorting" influences. 40 It is,
in addition, a theory which strives to allow courts to resolve alimony disputes without evaluating the spouses' moral relations
and which is repeatedly contrasted with alternative theories
which would require such evaluations. Because the theory is
carefully justified in non-moral terms and because it sedulously
seeks to allow courts to avoid moral inquiries, I see the theory as
embodying the trend toward diminished moral discourse. 41
Despite the insight and ingenuity which The Theory devotes to constructing a theory of alimony which does not rely on
moral discourse for its justification or application, its success is
limited by several obstacles. The nature and number of these
obstacles suggest to me that removing moral discourse from the
law of alimony has serious drawbacks. More specifically, a morally neutral justification for alimony probably cannot be constructed, and legislatures and courts cannot easily exclude the
moral relations of the parties from their decisions about
alimony.

B. Can There Be a Morally Neutral Justification for
Alimony?
We will look first at The Theory's attempt to find a morally
40. I am not, of course, suggesting that Professor Ellman's approach is without a
possible moral foundation, much less that it is immoral. I am suggesting that it avoids
describing that foundation and that it tries to take divorce courts out of the business of
evaluating the moral relations of the parties.
41. I see it as embodying that trend in its most admirable form. The theory is
driven away from moral discourse by the most serious kinds of problems with such discourse in family law, and the theory is free of the shallow psychological ideas which have
hastened the abandonment of moral discourse.
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neutral justification for alimony. I will wind up arguing that that
attempt does not succeed. But in order to make my position
clear, it will be necessary to digress slightly to distinguish that
position from a more general view about the impossibility of
moral neutrality in family law.
We begin, then, with the banal but relevant observation
that (in some but not all important senses) the law cannot escape affecting the way people behave in life generally and in
marriages particularly. Whatever alimony rules we write (even if
we write none) will affect the incentive structure of marital decisions and thus will (potentially) affect the moral relations of the
parties. Therefore any position the law of alimony takes must
have moral consequences, even if none are explicitly intended.
But this crude statement of the problem needs to be refined. There is indeed a sense in which the law cannot be truly
neutral toward any important aspect of human life. If people
aren't influenced by the law, they will be influenced by something else. That is, even when the law doesn't regulate people in
some respect, they will still face socially created incentive structures. These structures include the market, the network of psychological relationships in which people find themselves, the social institutions to which people belong, and the systems of
values-religious, philosophical, and cultural-to which people
adhere. By deciding not to impose its own incentive structures,
the law is in some sense deciding to leave people to be influenced by those alternative incentive structures alone. 42 Not to
decide is to decide, as the cliche goes. In any important area of
life, these alternative incentive structures will have different
moral consequences, consequences the government could have
tried to affect if it had chosen to. Thus the law cannot be morally neutral.
This line of reasoning has led some commentators to conclude that it is inapt or even meaningless to talk about government neutrality or to distinguish between government intervention and non-intervention in the family. 43 However, that
conclusion is misleadingly strong, and it obscures a good deal of
42. And of course these institutions themselves cannot easily escape being influenced by the state, so that even when the government does not directly regulate individuals, it may affect them through its influence on those institutions.
43. See Lee E. Teitelbaum, Family History and Family Law, 1985 Wise. L. Rev.
1135; Frances E. Olsen, The Myth of State Intervention in the Family, 18 U. Mich. J. L.
Ref. 835 (1985).
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complexity. It seems to me that there are often senses in which
it is useful to talk about government neutrality and distinguish
between intervention and non-intervention. Some of the obscured complexity can be gotten at by asking why we care
whether the government is neutral or whether it is intervening
in the family. One reason we care is because of the effect governmental action can have on people's lives and because of our preference for individual autonomy. But the fact that the law cannot
be morally neutral in the sense I described in the preceding paragraph does not mean that the law's decisions (whether to act or
not to act) always significantly affect people's lives. For instance,
governmental abstention will often leave family members with
the sense and even the reality of greater control over their lives
than direct governmental regulation of families. When the government does not act, and sometimes even when it does, the incentive structures which remain may be weak, and they may
conflict, so that people have some important degree of choice
about how to behave. This, I think, helps account for the almost
universal sense that there is a meaningful difference between
'government intervention and non-intervention.
In addition, it is too simple to see people as simply responding to the incentive structures of the government or of the social
institutions which are left free to act when the government
doesn't. It is too simple because many people will not see themselves as subject to those social institutions, but rather will feel
that those institutions are part of their own social and moral
personalities. For that matter, many people will not see the government as an entity entirely separate from themselves, but
rather will see the government acting as their own agents.
In addition, if we are evaluating the government's neutrality
it will often matter why the government has not acted. It is one
thing for the government to try to regulate an area of life with
the intention of promoting a moral view. It is another thing for
the government to decline to regulate that area of life for reasons other than a desire to promote a moral view by not acting
and thereby allowing other social institutions to operate unhindered by the government. There are a number of reasons the
government might choose not to act. It might simply conclude
that it lacked the economic resources to act, that it could not
make decisions as efficiently as another social institution, that it
could not enforce its decisions effectively, that it could not identify a goal it wished to reach, or that it lacked the legal authority
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to act. Often, the government may wish to promote some social
value or purpose but will be inhibited from acting because it
cannot act without impairing some other social value or purpose.
This is virtually a generic problem in family law. The government wants to protect family members from all kinds of harms.
However, it also wants to promote both the autonomy of families and family members. It will often be impossible for the government simultaneously to promote the autonomy of families
and of their members and impossible to promote either kind of
autonomy while protecting family members from harm.
When the government fails to act for reasons of this kind,
its decision may have moral consequences, but it will often be
imprecise to say that the government intended them. Sometimes
the government will have been truly indifferent-that is, it will
have concluded that all the likely outcomes were equally desirable or undesirable. Sometimes it will have preferred one outcome but found itself barred (for the kinds of reasons I sketched
above) from acting to effectuate that outcome. Sometimes it will
simply not have realized that there was an issue to resolve.
The idea of governmental neutrality has another component. It is sometimes thought that it is better for the government not to try to affect the "socially created incentive structures" of which I spoke earlier. The reason given for this view
may be that those structures operate more efficiently and make
better decisions than the government could. This is of course the
classic rationale for laissez-faire in economic policy, and it too ~s
part of the rationale for the doctrine of "family autonomy." The
reason may also be that those structures serve important social
purposes and that they would be weakened if the government
actively regulated them. 44 This is of course a classic rationale for
the separation of church and state, and it too is part of the rationale for the doctrine of family autonomy. Or the reason may
be that it is thought that government "neutrality" gives those
structures leeway to operate and allows people more autonomy
than governmental supervention would. Here again we encounter another rationale for the doctrine of family autonomy. The
fact that the government in some sense allows these institutions
to function and even that it in some ways promotes them does
44. For such an argument, see Peter L. Berger and Richard Neuhaus, To Empower
People (1977), and Bruce C. Hafen, The Family as an Entity, 22 U. Cal. Davis L. Rev.
865 (1989).
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not mean that they are simply the government's agents or that
they are not in basic ways independent of the government.
For all these reasons, it will often mean little to say that the
government cannot be morally neutral. Sometimes the government will not in any useful sense be pursuing any moral goal,
will not be seen to be doing so, and will be having little effect.
On the other hand, The Theory's alimony regime is not intended
to be such a circumstance. That regime has what we have been
calling a hortatory purpose-it seeks to affect people's behavior,
and seeks to do so in the service of a set of moral goals. It seeks,
that is, to promote a particular kind of marital sharing and a
"traditional ideal" {p. 72) of child-care. It is true that The Theory is framed in the apparently neutral terms of the market.
However, as Professor Ellman would no doubt acknowledge,
market principles rest on their own moral ideas and have their
own moral consequences.
But even if the particular theory we are analyzing were not
"hortatory," it would still have trouble finding a morally neutral
basis. Alimony itself is a legal doctrine. The spouses' very dispute over alimony exists because the law makes alimony possible. Not only has the law created alimony, having created it, it
must set rules for it. As we have seen, if alimony has a hortatory
purpose, the law must decide which goals to promote. If, on the
other hand, its purpose is to resolve disputes, it still must decide
which rules will resolve disputes most fairly. For all these reasons, the government cannot achieve any genuine neutrality.
More specifically, there are two kinds of reasons it will be
hard to write morally neutral rules for alimony. The first is that
there are many goals we may reasonably want marriages to attain and that these goals as a practical matter often conflict. To
put the conflict in the most general terms, we may want to promote a conception of the couple as an indivisible entity and yet
also to promote the personal autonomy of both spouses. It is
probably impossible to write rules that will reliably accomplish
both these goals for most of the people to whom the rules will
apply.
The second problem returns us to Professor Atiyah's distinction between the hortatory and dispute-settlement functions
of the law. As we have seen, the law of alimony has to operate in
two different contexts: first, it establishes rules that affect the
decisions of couples while they are married; second, it establishes rules to govern the marriage's dissolution. But, as Profes-
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sor Atiyah observes, "the desire to settle a present dispute by
imposing a decision which does justice in all the circumstances
of the case is often likely to conflict with the desire to encourage
or discourage particular types of behaviour in the future." 45 This
conflict infects the law. of alimony in a way that reiterates the
conflict I discussed in the preceding paragraph. In its hortatory
function, the law is centrally concerned with encouraging the
spouses to be concerned for each other; in its dispute-settlement
function, the law is primarily interested in resolving a dispute
between the two individuals and in disentangling their affairs so
that they need not deal with each other.
Spouses will always find themselves torn between the values
of the marketplace and the values of the family, between their
ambitions for themselves and their hopes for each other. The
law of alimony may make some of those choices easier, but at
the expense of making others harder. As I argued above, The
Theory's attempt to remove "distorting" influences so as to
"free" marital decisions failed. The theory would remove the
wife's risk that her investment would go unrewarded because of
divorce, but it would impose on the husband almost the full risk
that the wife's investment in her own career would to some degree have failed. This dilemma appeared as well in The Theory's
efforts to develop a model of undistorted marital decisions. The
theory, as we saw, turned out to favor marital sharing intended
to increase the family's income at the expense of other kinds of
marital sharing and to promote maximizing the family's income
instead of maximizing women's pursuit of careers in the
marketplace.
To make clearer and more concrete the potential number
and scope of the often-irreconcilable goals of alimony, let me
suggest some of the plenitude of goals we might rationally want
to reach. One might believe, on a variety of theories, that alimony should be awarded to alleviate the economic need of a
spouse after divorce. One might seek, as The Theory does, to
affect marital behavior through alimony rules. More specifically,
one might wish to foster mutual trust, concern, and generosity.
Or one might, on several grounds, strive to promote the autonomy of the two spouses after, or even while they are married.
One might construct alimony law to maximize the degree of
45. P.S. Atiyah, From Principles to Pragmatism: Changes in the Function of the
Judicial Process and the Law, 65 Iowa L. Rev. 1249, 1250 (1980).
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equality between the spouses after divorce. One might want a
law of alimony that optimized the predictability of the law, so
that at least the spouses could know what to expect if they got
divorced and could plan accordingly and so that judicial decisions could be made more accurately and efficiently. One might
seek an alimony law that brought the relations of the parties to
as complete an end as possible (which of course might mean no
alimony at all or only something like rehabilitative alimony).
One might write alimony rules that recompensed each spouse for
any sacrifice he or she had made for the other. One might devise
a law of alimony that prevented the disappointment of the financial expectations one spouse had of the other. One might
prefer a law of alimony which encouraged or even required
spouses to enter into pre-divorce contractual agreements governing the handling of their financial affairs on divorce. One
might want the law to award alimony according to the marital
fault (traditionally understood or otherwise) of the parties. One
might wish, for any number of reasons, to eliminate alimony altogether. Obviously, not all these goals are by themselves sufficient bases for a complete theory of alimony. But all of them are
plausible and substantial goals. And it does not take much examination to see that they are far from being mutually compatible (even though they are not all mutually incompatible).46
In sum, alimony rules must affect marital decisions of the
kind with which we are concerned, and those decisions have important moral dimensions. We thus must choose which kinds of
decisions to promote, and thus we must ask what moral views of
marriage we prefer. If we must choose between approaches with
different moral consequences, better that we should consider
those consequences as carefully as possible. The Theory does
not profess to escape choices of this kind entirely. Indeed, at one
point it claims to "generate[] alimony rules that encourage the
kind of marital behavior we want" (p. 52). But it is half-hearted
and ambivalent about doing so, and thus never asks what "kind
of marital behavior we want" with enough persistence to yield
persuasive and useful answers. Thus, while The Theory cogently
argues in favor of making it safe for spouses to maximize their
family's income, its desire for a morally neutral justification for
46. I explore each of these possible goals in my forthcoming casebook-Carl E.
Schneider, Family Law.
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alimony deters it from sufficiently considering other desirable
goals and from fully justifying the goal it does choose.
That desire for a morally neutral justification for alimony
also leads the theory into some uncomfortable if unintended results. Suppose that the theory were adopted and that it achieved
the prominence a hortatory law must have to work well. What
inferences might people draw from it? People seem likely to assume that the theory rewards with alimony the behavior which
the law particularly values and that it refuses thus to reward
apparently similar behavior which it does not value. 47 The theory in fact rewards only "economically rational" behavior. It rewards only investments a "self-interested" bargainer would
make. It expressly declines to reward otherwise identical sacrifices which a self-interested bargainer would not make. An investment made with an eye to getting something for yourself is
protected; an investment made only to benefit someone else is
not. I suspect, then, that people who had not read The Theory
of Alimony would conclude that the law conceived of families in
exclusively economic terms (rather than in a combination of economic, social, psychological, and moral terms), that the law
thought of spouses as separate bargainers and not as part of a
marital entity, and that the law valued self-interest more than
altruism. In these ways, the tlieory seems conducive to readings
which I think many people would join me in regretting. Indeed,
even the fact that the theory seems to suggest that sacrifices
must be recompensed on divorce may undercut the sense that
spouses ought to have of obligation to the family and each other
and of love for each other which may itself be a sufficient basis
for sacrifice. 48
The theory obviously does not set out to send any such
messages. Professor Ellman can reasonably say that the law of
alimony surely ought not penalize spouses for their generosity to
each other by refusing to take that generosity into account when
setting alimony. It may be perverse that a theory designed to
recompense a spouse for sacrifices should also seem to undercut
an important basis for making sacrifices. But that perversity
47. In fact, this is not the articulated basis for the theory. But as I argued earlier,
that basis seems to me far too complex, sophisticated, and delicate ever to penetrate the
public consciousness.
48. For a thoughtful discussion of the problems with deploying the law's expressive
function, see Carol Weisbrod, On the Expressive Functions of Family Law, 22 U.C. Davis
L. Rev. 991 (1989).
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suggests once again how hard, even impossible, it is to find a
morally neutral basis for the law of alimony. It also suggests
again the complexities with which a theory of alimony based on
the hortatory function must cope.

C. Should Courts Be Barred from Considering the Spouse's
Moral Relations in Awarding Alimony?
I have been exploring ·some of the difficulties with the theory's attempt to find a morally neutral basis for alimony. We
will now examine its attempt to relieve courts of the burden of
examining the moral relations of the parties in making alimony
awards. Of course the extent to which a court needs to look at
the moral relations of the parties will vary according to the theory of alimony that is adopted. I cannot specify exactly what
kind of moral discourse courts ought to undertake in alimony
disputes until I present my own theory of alimony (and also of
marital property), which I am not yet prepared to do. Here, I
wish to argue against The Theory's position that courts should
be barred from considering the spouses' moral relations in
awarding alimony and in favor of the position that such an inquiry may sometimes be desirable. I will advance several reasons
for these arguments. Centrally, I will observe that the people the
law seeks to affect themselves think in moral terms. A law which
tries to eliminate those terms from its language will both misunderstand the people it is regulating and be misunderstood by
them.
The Theory seeks to influence the way husbands and wives
make decisions which have important economic consequences,
and it seeks to analyze those decisions in economic terms. But
husbands and wives do not make those decisions in purely economic terms. They often take into account, sometimes very centrally into account, the moral environment and consequences of
their choices. As I have argued at some length, The Theory's
economic analysis is repeatedly led astray by its attempt to exclude these non-economic considerations from its calculus. In
consequence, the theory is based on hortatory goals that cannot
be met, on principles that cannot be wholly reconciled, and on
calculations that cannot be satisfactorily made.
Reducing moral discourse in alimony decisions not only
leads the law to misunderstand families. It also leads families to
misunderstand the law. Family law generally, and the law of alimony and marital property particularly, try to regulate two of
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the most intimate, complex, and consequential things in people's
lives-their closest personal relations and their money. People
want, and perhaps expect, such a law to make its decisions individually and meticulously, giving its full attention to the whole
situation in which the specific parties were acting and to the differences between the specific parties and the rest of the world.
Because morality matters deeply to most people, they will consider their moral relations a central part of that full situation
and those differences. In other words, the theory establishes a
bright-line rule for deciding disputes over alimony. But that rule
inhibits courts from making individualized decisions and taking
the complete circumstances of the case into account in a category of cases in which those circumstances will seem specially
relevant to the litigants.
The point is not just that people legitimately expect that
their deepest relationships will not be dissolved and their life's
assets will not be distributed in so procrustean a fashion. It is
that, in a world in which most people cannot be persuaded to
study the law of alimony closely while they are married, the law
should stay in touch with the concerns of the people it affects so
that their reasonable expectations about the law are not disappointed. Spouses are likely to assume that the law of alimony
will attempt to do some kind of justice among the parties, taking
their full situation into account. Insofar as spouses take law into
account in making decisions, they are likely to shape their marital behavior according to such a view of the law. Where there are
not strong indications to the contrary, there is much to be said
for accommodating those views.
Another obstacle to eliminating moral discourse from family
law is that there are important reasons for wanting to retain it.
The family is a central social institution which affects people in
many of the most basic aspects of their lives. The obligations
family members assume to each other, then, will have important
social consequences, consequences in which the law has a legitimate interest. The legitimacy of that interest is testified to by
the fact that, although both sides of the political spectrum vigorously assert that families have a basic claim to freedom from
government regulation, both sides also regularly find occasions
when that claim should yield to social interests. Thus some people on the right argue in favor of traditional alimony rules partly
on the ground that they strengthen the family by enforcing the
obligations and the sense of obligation family members are
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taken to.owe each other. And thus some people on the left argue
in favor either of restricting alimony (for example, by making
alimony available only for rehabilitative purposes) or of expanding alimony (for example, by making alimony available in
the kind of ways advanced by The Theory) as a means of promoting women's moral claims to autonomy and self-sufficiency.
Indeed, at several points The Theory itself defends its alimony
rules on the ground that they "encourage the kind of marital
behavior we want" (p. 52). Thus the theory seeks to promote
"marital sharing" (of some kinds), and it specially rewards investments in child rearing partly on the grounds that it is "not
merely a life-style preference but a traditional ideal" (p. 72).
The social interest in alimony which has traditionally had
special weight has to do with another of the law's functions-the
protective function. 49 It is a basic function of law to protect citizens against harms done them by their fellows. Because spouses
do and should be able to depend on each other, and because
spouses are for that and other reasons peculiarly vulnerable to
each other, spouses can easily and severely injure each other in
many ways. Alimony has traditionally been understood to be one
way in which the law protects former spouses from the financial
component of such injuries. Since those financial injuries can be
devastating, this social purpose ought not be easily discarded.
And it is a purpose which can be best served where the law undertakes the moral inquiry into whether such an injury has been
done.
I have been principally suggesting that we must consider
the moral relations of the parties if the law of alimony is to serve
the hortatory and protective functions satisfactorily. I now wish
to suggest that those moral relations must be considered when
the law of alimony performs the dispute-settlement function. It
is the heart of that function to settle disputes fairly. The moral
relations between the spouses will be an important factor in
thinking about what is fair, and therefore should be considered
by courts. Suppose, for example, that a wife makes an investment of the kind the theory protects, and that in return she exacts important non-economic concessions from her husband.
Suppose further that the wife subsequently divorces her husband for reasons that cannot be attributed to him. Under the
theory, a court could consider only the wife's investment; it
49. I analyze this function in detail in Carl E. Schneider, Family Law (forthcoming).
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could not consider what the husband gave in return or that he
was not responsible for the wife's failure to receive the long-term
economic benefit from her investment. But under these circumstances, is it fair to require the husband to protect her investment after divorce in the form of alimony? The unfairness of the
result in this hypothetical is suggested by the extent to which it
shows how the theory departs from its own rationale. The theory
seeks to provide the wife the contract she would have negotiated
had it been practical for her to do so. Yet the theory denies the
husband the benefits that contract would have provided
him-protection for the consideration he supplied and freedom
from paying damages where he did not breach the contract.
One indication of the drawbacks of analyzing alimony in
non-moral terms is that Professor Ellman's theory itself is more
persuasively stated and its drawbacks are better understood in
moral terms. Much of w;hat makes that theory attractive is that
it accords with some widely held moral ideas. The theory is appealing because it summons to mind and appropriately resolves
a paradigm case in which the wife has powerful moral claims on
her husband. This paradigm case has a number of features. In it,
the wife makes a genuine, deliberate, irreparable sacrifice of her
interest in pursuing a career and of her earning power. She also
provides services (especially child-rearing and housekeeping)
which she does not wholly relish and which are socially less prestigious than her husband's employment. She makes the sacrifice
partly because of social pressures to do so, social pressures which
both encourage her to "serve" her family and discourage her
from pursuing a career. The husband does not just acquiesce in
this decision; he at least expects and perhaps demands it. The
husband's interest in pursuing a career and his earning power
are directly, deeply, and indelibly benefitted by the sacrifice.
The wife sacrifices in the belief that the marriage is permanent,
or at least in the expectation that both parties will earnestly
strive to make it so.
When the divorce comes, it is (in this paradigm case) the
husband's "fault," if only in the sense that the husband, as the
more powerful spouse, had greater responsibility for the success
of the marriage. When the couple is divorced, the woman bears
the heavier burdens of raising the children, with less ability to
enter the job market because of those burdens, with less earning
ability because of the sacrifice she made, with less ability than
she once had and than her husband presently has to find a
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spouse, 110 with little property (if only because most divorcing
couples have little property to divide), with child-support payments which are set low and which are hard to collect, and with,
in consequence of all this, a diminished social and economic position which will seem hard to improve. Her husband, on the
other hand, is freed of the daily drudgeries of parenthood, retains the advantages in pursuing a career and earning a living
which his wife's sacrifice gave him, and experiences little diminution and perhaps even an improvement in his social and economic position. The wife is in need, in several senses. She may
be in absolute need-she may have fallen below the poverty line.
She will at least be in need relative to her former social position.
And she will be in need relative to her husband. Relatively, the
husband is less likely to be in need and may be able to help his
(former) wife supply her needs.
The force of the paradigm case largely arises from the personal and moral relationship between the husband and wife. It
arises from the belief that she was weak and he was strong and
that he took advantage of her weakness and his strength. It
arises from the belief that she made a sacrifice for him and he
made none for her. It arises from the sense that the parties had
made a life-long commitment to love and care for each other,
and that the wife kept that commitment while the husband
evaded it. The legal terms in which the paradigm case is most
appealingly resolved are some of those that are most charged
with moral ideas and that reflect the kinds of concerns about the
paradigm case that I have just described-ideas like unjust enrichment, restitution, reliance, and possibly even contract. And
the best explanation for why the husband might owe the wife
alimony will arise from the moral consequences of their moral
relations.
It is then not surprising that The Theory is most persuasive
where it does not require us to ignore the moral relations of the
parties. Thus The Theory succeeds best where it explores the
financial relations between the husband and wife in something
like the paradigm case and where it shows in careful detail the
economic consequences of the wife's sacrifice and the analysis
she would undertake were she only a rational economic actor.
50. This is a point which Professor Ellman develops with some care. I have not dealt
with it, however, because Professor Ellman concludes that any remedy for a loss of marriage prospects "requires a different theoretical exercise than the one advanced here" (p.
81).
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, When it does this, The Theory does much to help us understand
what the moral relations of the parties are and thus what the
legal relations of the parties should be.
Correspondingly, The Theory is less successful in two other
circumstances. The first is where it attempts to justify denying
alimony in something like the paradigm case. For example, its
explanation of why a wife who makes a financially irrational sacrifice does not receive the same protection as a wife who makes
an identical but economically rational sacrifice seems unpersuasive, and it seems so in part because it ignores the moral reasons
we might want to require the husband to pay alimony. We might
want to require him to do so because he has induced his wife to
enrich him at her expense where the "confidential" relationship
between husband and wife made that behavior morally dubious.
In some circumstances we might want to require the husband to
do so because of the wife's need. Professor Ellman says, and he
is right, that we cannot require one person to support another
simply because that person can afford to provide support and
the other needs it. But people who have taken on obligations to
live together for life (or at least to struggle to do so), whose lives
have become intertwined, and who have come by mutual consent
to rely on each other in special ways, may also become responsible for each other after marriage.
I want to dwell on this point for a moment. In his article in
this symposium, Professor Ellman says that" '[n]eed' has never
been a satisfactory explanation for alimony, since it begs the
question of why the needy person's former spouse . . . should be
liable to meet that need . . . . " 51 But the traditional law of alimony was not so mindless that it failed to answer that question.
Nor ought that answer be understood simply in terms of gender
roles or of marital fault narrowly understood. Rather, that answer, put in gender neutral terms, was the explanation I articulated in the preceding paragraph: One spouse may come to owe
the other support after marriage because of the moral relationships between spouses that are generally part of marriage. In
short, the riddle of alimony has a traditional answer. It is not
that need gives rise to obligation. It is that entering into the special relationship that is marriage and behaving in some kinds of
51. Ira Mark Ellman, Should Nonfinancial Losses and Motivations be Included in
the Theory of Alimony?, 1991 B.Y.U. L. Rev. 259, 262.
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ways in that relationship can give rise to an obligation to a former spouse who is in need.
I have been saying that the first circumstance in which The
Theory is least convincing is where it attempts to justify denying alimony in something like my paradigm case. The second
such circumstance is where it attempts to justify requiring alimony in something unlike the paradigm case. I have asked a
number of questions about the theory based on significant variations on the paradigm: I have, for instance, asked why the wife
whose "investment" was neither a sacrifice nor even what we
would ordinarily recognize as an investment should receive alimony and why the wife who received a full return (or even more
than a full return) on her investment in the form of enhanced
family income or reciprocal sharing should receive alimony.
These questions suppose that the moral relations between the
parties are more complicated than The Theory assumes. To
some extent, these questions even raise the possibility that to
impose alimony on the husband would be morally problematic.
The Theory's answers to these questions are crucially limited by
its desire to escape moral issues.
The Theory proffers several reasons for excluding inquiries
into the moral relations between the parties. These reasons are
substantial and deserve attention. The first is that the "modern
divorce reform movement" has rejected all fault reasoning. But
it is not so clear that it has or that it should. Historically, there
was probably never a considered decision to reject all fault reasoning in all aspects of divorce law. When no-fault divorce was
presented to legislatures, it was treated to a surprising degree as
an issue primarily of interest to lawyers and even as an almost
technical problem in judicial administration. Thus the full implications of no-fault divorce were not explored even by those
who were involved in the adoption of the reform, and the public
at large was hardly aware even of the limited debate that did
occur. 112
52. Herbert Jacob, A Silent Revolution: Routine Policy Making and the Transformation of Divorce Law in the United Stat~s (1988). (For a precis of Professor Jacob's
themes, see Carl E. Schneider, Legislatures and Legal Change: The Reform of Divorce
Law, 86 Mich. L. Rev. 1121 (1988)). As Professor Wardle writes,
The adoption of no-fault divorce grounds was intended primarily to reduce the
acrimony of divorce proceedings, eliminate a major incentive for perjury, close
the 'gap' between the written divorce law and the law as actually enforced and
reflect the modern notion that charging and proving marital misconduct should
not be necessary to obtain a divorce when the parties have mutually agreed to
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Quite apart from what may historically have been intended
in the move toward no-fault divorce, present practice does not in
fact wholly abandon "fault" reasoning. Some jurisdictions today
expressly allow fault to be taken into account in considering alimony and child custody. Many jurisdictions directly require
courts to ask what is "equitable" when dividing the spouses'
property, a requirement which seems expressly to invite some
kind of inquiry into their moral relations. For that matter, a
number of jurisdictions retain fault grounds for divorce along
with no-fault grounds.
' Nor does it logically follow from the adoption of no-fault
divorce that fault cannot be taken into account in setting alimony. As I recently wrote,
Fault was eliminated as a basis for divorce partly because it
was thought that people could not usefully be made to live together if they did not want to, whatever their moral relationship. However, in deciding what financial obligations the parties continue to have to each other after the marriage is ended,
enforcement problems become less severe and the moral relationship may well be relevant. Indeed, that relevance seems to
be conceded by the usual direction to the court to make
whatever distribution of property and income may be thought
to be "right," or "justifiable," or "equitable." It may be true
that another reason for no-fault divorce was legislative reluctance to exacerbate the tensions between the parties by discussing painful subjects, but such discussions as to alimony
should have fewer consequences, given that divorce has already
been decided on. Indeed, to ignore the moral relationship between the parties in setting alimony awards can itself exacerbate tensions. Further, as Professor Miiller-Freienfels points
out, "there are more possibilities, in practice, of mitigating
fault, and reducing its impact; so as to permit compromises"
when dealing with alimony. 113

Even if no-fault divorce was intended to mean all that The
Theory takes it to mean, we may still ask whether that is what it
ought to mean. We need not restore the status quo ante; sufficient unto that day was the evil thereof. But it may be profitable
divorce.
Wardle, No-Fault Divorce and the Divorce Conundrum, 1991 B.Y.U. L. Rev. 79, 80.
53. Schneider, Moral Discourse and the Transformation of American Family Law,
83 Mich. L. Rev. 1803, 1810-11, n.12 (1985), quoting Muller-Freienfels, The Marriage
Law Reform of 1976 in the Federal Republic of Germany, 28 Int'l & Comp. L.Q. 184, 195
(1979).
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to do what we have not yet done-to look carefully and critically
at the implications of interpreting no-fault divorce as reading
moral discourse out of each area of divorce law.
The Theory's second reason for excluding inquiries into the
moral relations of the parties is that there is so much social disagreement about modern marital relations that we have no standards by which to judge them. There is plainly something to this
argument. The point is not just that groups in society will disagree with each other about those standards; it is also that even a
particular individual will often want conflicting things of marriage. But I do not think this argument should be taken too far.
For one thing, it is not clear to me that there is in fact as much
conflict about what marriage should be as The Theory seems to
suggest, or that the conflict about marriage that exists would
necessarily cripple attempts to take moral problems into account
in writing alimony rules. In any event, there is social disagreement about all important areas of public policy. The processes
of democratic government exist to resolve those disagreements.
They are available to resolve uncertainties about the moral obligations of spouses. 114
The Theory's third justification for avoiding moral discourse (and, of course, one of the justifications for no-fault divorce) is that it "would require [an] ... impractical inquiry into
spousal understandings ..." (p. 64). This is no doubt true and
no doubt important. Yet I have been arguing that it can also be
impractical and unjust not to make those inquiries. Which evil
ought we prefer? There may not be a really good way of deciding. But the law's usual resolution of this quandary (which is
hardly unique to family law) is probably to rely on the parties
and the adversary system to illuminate the evidence as fully as
possible and to rely on the fact-finder to reach the best decision
it can. That best decision will often be imprecise and inelegant,
but it may also more regularly work a better justice than any of
the alternatives. Although I am not firmly convinced, I am inclined to think that, all things considered, this may be a better
solution for the law of alimony than such procrustean rules as
The Theory advocates.
That solution is also, I suspect, likely to be what, in princi54. I discuss the problem of social dissensus and standards for resolving family-law
disputes at length in Carl E. Schneider, Discretion, Rules, and Law: Child-Custody Decisions and the UMDA's Best-Interest Standard, 89 Mich. L. Rev. _ _ (1991).
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ple, at least, most parties to divorce actions would want. As I
argued above, husbands and wives think of their relations partly
in moral terms, and they will find it hard to understand a law
which ignores so important an aspect of their relations. And all
litigants want courts to take the particular facts of their situation into account. The effect of approaches like The Theory's is
that individualized justic·e is denied and that bright-line rules
are substituted for it. ·The theory's is a bright-line rule for two
reasons. First, a wife is entitled to alimony as long as she has
made a particular kind of marital investment, even though
awarding her alimony would not be necessary to promote the
ends of alimony and even though there might be strong equitable arguments against awarding her alimony. Second, a wife who
has not made that kind of investment is not entitled to alimony
even though awarding her alimony would promote the ends of
alimony and even though there might be strong equitable arguments for awarding her alimony.
To be sure, there are powerful arguments for bright-line
rules, but I doubt that they apply forcefully in this context.
Bright-line rules may usually be desirable where the law's purpose is hortatory, since they will often communicate the law's
intent and content more clearly than more complicated and less
emphatic alternatives. However, bright-line rules will often be
less suitable where the law's purpose is to resolve disputes, since,
even more than most rules, they will prevent the decision-maker
from considering factors that are relevant to a fair decision. This
drawback will be specially pronounced where, as in alimony, the
dispute is between people whose relations are intricately complex and whose whole lives and fortunes seem so nearly at stake.
I think it is probably true that my broader view of alimony
could not be reduced to a few rules, that it would require courts
to exercise some significant (but not unfettered) degree of discretion. I suspect that that exercise of discretion is part of what
Professor Ellman seeks to avoid. And I sympathize with that impulse. Whether it is safe to confide decisions about alimony importantly (but not exclusively) to judicial discretion seems to me
a question which deserves its own article, since I believe that the
choice between rules and discretion is both intricately complex
and context-specific. Here I can only say that I am led by my
investigation of judicial discretion in child -custody cases to
doubt that the risks of discretion are as uniformly and over-
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whelmingly great as is often supposed. 55 Allowing discretion to
guide decisions is at least not a radical position. The traditional
standards for alimony were vague enough to allow a good deal of
judicial discretion. And although the Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act limits judicial discretion to grant alimony, it accords
lavish discretion to judges in the related (on some views almost
identical) question of deciding how the spouses' property should
be divided. 56
I should stress that The Theory's arguments for rejecting
moral discourse are weighty. But for the reasons I have just
presented, I do not believe they are dispositive or that they
clearly outweigh the countervailing arguments in favor of such
discourse in alimony law. As I have argued, no morally neutral
basis for alimony law can be found, the behavior of spouses cannot be understood without looking to their moral relations,
spouses expect that courts will take those relations into account
in making decisions about alimony, there are social reasons we
might not want a morally neutral law of alimony, and courts
resolving disputes between divorcing couples should attempt to
do so individually and justly.
In any event, moral discourse in the law of alimony has
been made less problematic by recent developments in family
law. The conventional means by which the law attempts to avoid
dealing with the moral relations of parties is to allow people to
enter into contracts and thereby to settle their moral relations
for themselves. Family law has become increasingly receptive to
contract as a mode of ordering marital relations. Thus couples
who do not wish to have courts consult their moral relations in
awarding alimony might be allowed to write their own contracts
specifying what economic obligations they would have to each
other on divorce. While I agree with Professor Ellman that marital contracts generally present serious problems,57 I wonder
55. Id.
56. It will no doubt be said that judicial discretion in awarding alimony was abused.
This is a question that can be answered only with empirical information which we now
lack. However, I would ask whether discretion was in fact being abused or whether it was
simply being exercised in ways that were once acceptable but no longer are. I would also
ask whether undesirable kinds of decisions about alimony can be identified and specifically prohibited, thereby preserving the advantages of some degree of discretion while
preventing some of the most serious and systematic misuses of it. For more such questions, see id., passim.
57. I treat some of these problems and a host of the other drawbacks of contractualizing family law in Carl E. Schneider, Family Law (forthcoming).
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whether they are as acute in the context of the theory as he assumes. Professor Ellman believes the wife cannot protect herself
contractually as the parts supplier can. He reasons that, because
of the "indefinite nature of the parties' marital obligations," the
"[p]rospective spouses will usually be unable to specify the details of their marital obligations sufficiently to permit objective
determinations of breach" (pp. 44-45). But this seems to assume
that any contract would be one which tried to regulate all the
couple's affairs. Might not the couple, for example, contract at
the time of the marriage or of the sacrifice to a private version of
Professor Ellman's alimony scheme, thereby protecting the wife
at least as fully as judicial adoption of Professor Ellman's theory
of alimony would? It may be hard for the couples to foresee how
the theory's kind of alimonial relief would work in their own future situation, but The Theory is already willing to impose such
relief on every couple. That seems to suggest that the foreseeability problem is not, in this particular instance, forbiddingly
great. If it is acceptable to have the state provide alimonial relief
of the kind the theory contemplates in every case, would it not
also be acceptable to have couples adopt that form of relief for
their own particular case? If the wife's interest in protecting the
kind of investment The Theory treats is great enough to be the
only basis for alimony, is it not also great enough for couples to
make it the basis for a contractual agreement either before the
marriage or at the time of the investment?
Finally, moral discourse in the law of alimony may also
seem somewhat less troublesome if we recall that most divorce
cases are settled by the parties. (The usual estimate is that only
about ten percent are actually litigated.) For those couples who
settle their disputes out of court, the formal inquiry into their
moral relationship need never happen. True, they may negotiate
"in the shadow of the law." But it is far from clear just how
much that shadow actually affects negotiations. And any such
effect will be diminished where, as seems likely in the case of
alimony, the message of the law's shadow cannot be interpreted
with any real certainty. And if I am right that moral issues will
be relevant to whether alimony should be awarded and that the
parties themselves will have moral issues centrally in mind, it
will not take the law's shadow to lead the parties to those
issues. 5 8
58. I discuss the law's effect on bargaining at divorce at some length in my forth-
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CoNCLUSION

In the end, I wonder whether The Theory of Alimony in
fact answers the riddle of alimony. The riddle is why one spouse
owes the other support after divorce. The Theory's answer is
that one spouse (let us continue to call her the wife) has suffered
a loss. But why is the husband responsible for repairing that
loss? The Theory does not find the reason in the fact that he in
some sense caused the loss or that he benefitted from it and
should have to disgorge that benefit. On the contrary, the theory
rejects any such inquiry into the relations of the spouses.
Rather, the theory finds its reason for alimony in the law's hortatory function, in the need to remove disincentives to a particular kind of marital sharing.
But is this justification for alimony persuasive? Why should
one spouse be singled out to pay perhaps considerable sums in
order to support a general system of incentives? In the criminal
law, we do something that may be analogous. That is, we justify
punishment partly on the grounds of its contribution to general
deterrence. But thus singling out one person to bear the disproportionate costs of a social program seems less problematic in
the criminal law (although it is hardly unproblematic even
there), since the person being singled out has done something
wrong and has subjected himself to punishment. But whether
the spouse who is made to pay alimony under the theory has
done anything at all to justify using him in this way is a question the theory prevents us even from asking. In other words, I
have the same problem with the theory's focus on loss that the
theory has with the law's focus on need: Why is the former
spouse singled out to bear the burden?
If The Theory does answer the riddle, I wonder whether it
does so by changing the question the riddle asks. Alimony is
conventionally understood to mean the support one spouse pro- .
vides another after divorce. But The Theory strips away from
alimony all payments except those necessary to restore to the
wife any loss of earning capacity she may have suffered from a
sacrifice of earning capacity made as a rational means of maximizing the family's wealth. The theory may be correct, but is
what it justifies alimony? Not in our conventional understanding
of that term, at least.
coming casebook. ld.
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I almost wonder something else. I almost wonder whether
what Professor Ellman has done is not so much to expound a
theqry of alimony but rather to destroy all theories of alimony.
He attacks all the standard rationales for alimony: the traditional, the contractual, and the partnership explanations all fall
beneath his sword. He can justify only one very narrow form of
alimony, a form which hardly seems like alimony at all. And, as I
have tried to show, even that form of alimony is multiplicitously
problematic: it is hard to see how it will have a real effect on
incentives, it is not clear that its incentives will operate as they
are intended to, it involves cruelly complex and speculative calculations, and it will regularly produce (too many?) unfair results. Essentially, Professor Ellman argues that there is no judicially manageable market measure for most marital transactions.
I have argued that the one kind of marital transaction which
Professor Ellman is willing to see consulted in setting alimony is
subject to that same criticism and that that transaction cannot
in any case be fairly evaluated without evaluating the kinds of
transactions Professor Ellman would exclude. Thus I think it is
reasonable to ask whether the game is worth the candle, to ask
whether so diminished and distorted a form of alimony is worth
the many costs it would impose.
The abolition of alimony is certainly not unthinkable. If
there is no satisfactory rationale for alimony, alimony should be
abolished. At least in modern times, alimony has never been
awarded frequently. Its scope is currently being restricted, as
doctrines like rehabilitative alimony signify. Its scope will always
be limited in many cases by the inability of either spouse to contribute to the support of the other. And some of alimony's functions could still be served (and probably are now served)
through the divorce court's power to divide the spouses' property (and, for that matter, to order child support).
The abolition of alimony could be conceived of yet more
sweepingly. Divorce courts could be directed to do nothing more
than to allocate the property of the spouses to the spouse who
had title to the property and to enforce any contracts into which
the spouses had entered. Every time the spouses acquired property and decided whose name to put it in, they would be making
a decision about its disposition on divorce. Spouses could make
gifts to each other of property. They could dictate the allocation
of their property on divorce through ante-nuptial agreements,
through express contracts made during the marriage, or in set-

197]

RETHINKING ALIMONY

257

tlement agreements negotiated during divorce proceedings. This
would have the effect of maximizing the spouses' freedom to arrange their affairs and of reducing judicial power to a probable
minimum. In an important sense, then, this is probably the most
"neutral" system which could be adopted.
This already over-long disquisition on Professor Ellman's
theory of alimony is hardly the place to advance a fresh solution
to the alimony riddle. 119 And I have more ambivalences than solutions to offer. But I am dubious about the abolition of alimony. I am dubious first because I am reluctant to see the law
promote the view of marriage that I think most people would
associate with the abolition of alimony. That view of marriage
would emphasize the separateness of the spouses rather than
their unity. It would emphasize their autonomy from each other
rather than their obligations to each other. I am also dubious
because I think that there will too often be times when fairness
between the parties will demand that one of them assume some
continuing responsibility for the support of the other. To put
the point differently, I think there will be times when the law's
protective function demands that spouses be guarded against
the financial injuries to which they are specially vulnerable.
In sum, I suspect that the riddle of alimony already has an
answer. That answer lies in the traditional justification for alimony which I described earlier-that people who marry take on
special responsibilities for each other because of the commitment that defines marriage and because of the commitments
that grow out of a shared life. That answer is hardly a complete
answer. It remains to be said what commitments are instinct in
marriage, what commitments made during marriage should have
legal consequences, and what responsibilities those commitments give rise to. The task before us, then, is to ask what we
want of marriage as a social institution. For we cannot adopt a
theory of alimony until we construct a theory of marriage.

59. I explore the possible rationales for alimony in some detail in Carl E. Schneider,
Family Law (forthcoming).

